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Abstract    
  
Human cooperation and group living are based on societies in which individuals 
not only care about their own interests but share common norms and values – 
such as morality and prosocial behavior. As early as the 18th century, Immanuel 
Kant postulated autonomy as the key to human morality. Kant explained that a 
rational agent with a free will would necessarily make moral – not immoral – 
decisions. However, the fundamental question of how moral behavior acquires 
normative weight remains unresolved until the present day, especially when 
moral behavior entails personal costs for the individual. This dissertation builds on 
Kant’s thesis and aims to investigate important building blocks of moral autonomy 
at preschool age. Therefore, children’s own prosocial decisions as well as their 
normative and descriptive expectations about others’ prosocial actions are 
assessed and linked to fundamental underlying mechanisms such as cultural 
learning and collective intentionality.  
 Study 1 assessed whether preschoolers enforce agreed-upon prosocial 
versus selfish sharing norms in a group dictator game. Three- and 5-year-old 
children and two hand puppets had the opportunity to agree on how to distribute 
resources between themselves and a group of passive recipients. The findings 
suggest that preschoolers understand prosocial, but not selfish, agreements as 
binding even though prosocial sharing norms are associated with personal costs. 
Study Set 2 assessed in two experiments whether observed choice increases the 
children’s own prosocial sharing behavior. In Experiment 1, children observed an 
adult model who was provided with costly choice (i.e., sharing instead of keeping 
an item), (b) non-costly choice (i.e., sharing instead of watching an item be thrown 
away), or (c) no choice (i.e., being instructed to share an item). As a next step, 
children were given the opportunity to decide how many stickers (out of three) 
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they would like to share with a sad animal puppet. Experiment 2 aimed to 
investigate possible age effects. The study design was reduced to condition (a) and 
(c), a second test trial was added. Taken together, the results of Study Set 2 
suggest that 5-year-old’s (but not 4-year old’s) prosocial sharing behavior 
increases when previously having observed someone who intentionally acts 
prosocially at a personal cost. Study 3 investigated preschoolers’ descriptive 
expectations about the causal agent of prosocial and selfish actions, based on 
agents’ prior history of voluntary versus involuntary prosocial behavior. The 
results show that children at the age of 5.5 years use information about the 
circumstances and intentions of previous actions to generate descriptive 
expectations about other’s future prosocial behavior. From 4 years of age, children 
distinguish between an agent who shares voluntarily and an agent who shares only 
involuntarily.  
 Taken together, this dissertation shows that preschool aged children infer 
and enforce prosocial – but not selfish – sharing norms. They engage in prosocial 
sharing which is affected by observed choice and they form descriptive 
expectations about others tendency to behave prosocial or selfish on the base of 
their knowledge about the agents prosocial versus selfish intentions.   
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1 General Introduction  
 
 
In our globalized and technological-driven world, one can obtain a flood of 
information in a matter of seconds – the truth and origin of which must be verified. 
A few clicks on the smartphone not only provide extensive informational 
knowledge but can also fulfill various desires: To postulate your beliefs to a global 
audience, find the love of your life in the internet, or appreciation for your “outfit 
of the day”. People invest a lot of time and money to fulfill their desires – but 
sometimes, individual desires may conflict with the morally “right” thing to do. 
That is why we have to weigh different needs against each other every day which 
is particularly difficult when there is no predefined norm or rule of conduct: 
Flexibility of an own car versus environmental protection, sustainable shopping 
versus cheap clothing or spending money on a newspaper from a homeless person 
or buying an ice-cream. As a responsible member of society, it is crucial to develop 
a moral compass and to decide autonomously which sources to trust and which 
values to obtain.   
 Kant's concept of moral autonomy (1781/1913) examines the rationale of 
moral action and autonomous decisions. According to Kant, moral autonomy is not 
only free from heteronomous constraints, but also free from the compulsion to 
acutely satisfy own desires, which represents a central competence in the western 
world of the 21st century. The current dissertation chooses an empirical approach 
to investigate important building blocks of moral autonomy in preschool age. 
The will is therefore not merely subject to the law but is so 
subject that it must be considered as also making the law for 
itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the 
law (of which it can regard itself as the author). – Kant  
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Located in the domain of developmental psychology, three studies investigate 
prosocial decisions of children and their normative and descriptive expectations 
of others prosocial actions. The human-specific ability of cultural learning and 
collective intentionality are introduced as important underlying mechanisms.  
 Chapter 1 combines philosophical and psychological theories which 
represent the theoretical embedding of the empirical studies. Chapter 2-4 contain 
the empirical part of this thesis. The dissertation concludes with a general 
discussion of the results in the context of the theoretical background, the 
consideration of limitations and the discussion of possible future research 
perspectives (Chapter 5).  
1.1 Autonomy and Morality   
The following section presents two main approaches to autonomy in philosophical 
and psychological research. The chapter begins with an introduction to the 
concept of autonomy as – according to Kant's understanding – a prerequisite for 
all moral actions. In addition, autonomy in the sense of personal autonomy is 
considered from a psychological perspective. This is followed by a description of 
human morality – from a deontological point of view – referring to a set of norms 
that are prescribed as to how people should interact with each other. Further 
theories on human normativity are discussed, including important mechanisms of 
cultural learning and collective intentionality.  
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 Philosophical Perspectives on Moral Autonomy  
The noun autonomy is derived from the Greek words autós – itself and nómos – 
law and means "self-legislation” in the literal or "self-determination" in the 
broader sense (Goertz & Witting, 2018; Piper, 2010). In ancient Greece, Plato and 
Aristotle discussed autonomy as a form of self-determination (grounded in the 
idea of self-mastery) and stated that the rational part of the soul is the most just 
and truly a person’s own (Dryden, 2010; Gerson, 2014; Karuzis, 2015; Plato, 
BC380/1961). For Aristotle (BC350/2009), happiness was achieved through 
autarkeia (self-sufficiency), which he defined as dependence on reason instead of 
external forces. In the modern period, the concept of autonomy was characterized 
by the decline of religious authority and – with emphasis on individual reason – an 
increase in political freedom (Dryden, 2010). As Dryden (2010) points out, 
philosophers distinguish between moral autonomy, personal autonomy and 
political autonomy. Moral autonomy is usually associated with Kant and is 
understood as the source of moral principles which is inherent in a rational agent 
(Sensen, 2013). According to Kant`s (1785/1990) conception, morally autonomous 
action is determined by the individual’s will – instead of the power of political 
leaders, pastors or society 1  (Dryden, 2010). He famously concluded that the 
supreme principle of morality (i.e., the categorical imperative, see below) is based 
 
 
 
 
 
1 These would be defined as heteronomous principles or actions.  
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on practical reason and is a matter of rationality, not of passions, habits or the like. 
Kant’s understanding of practical reason – our ability to use reasons to choose our 
own action – requires that we understand ourselves as free (Christman, 2018). The 
free will of the individual is based on rational maxims which excludes feelings or 
emotions, habits and other non-intellectual factors from autonomous decision 
making (Dryden, 2010). In the 8th section of Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1913), 
Kant stresses the distinction between autonomous and heteronomous principles 
of action. He defines moral actions which are controlled by other than rational 
reasons as heteronomous. While autonomy is introduced as the categorical and 
sole principle of moral laws and obligations that are subject to a law-giving of its 
own (German: eigene Gesetzgebung), heteronomous actions are grounded in 
conditional principles which can be freely adopted from a source other than pure 
reason (O’Neill, 2011). 
 Kant’s rational maxims culminated in the categorical imperative (CI) which 
consists of several formulations. A maxim is a rule or principle of action, while a 
universal law refers to something that should always be followed in similar 
situations. “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law […] without contradiction” (Kant, 
1785/1990, p.38; Korsgaard, 1985). This means that only an action that is 
universalizable can be regarded as categorically moral. Practically speaking, to 
consider what would be the morally "right" thing to do in a specific situation one 
must choose an action that every person should perform in a comparable situation 
at any time – without exception. While the first formulation of the CI focusses on 
the universality of actions, the second formulation focusses on how to treat other 
people: ”Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only” (Kant, 1785/1990, p. 47). 
This means that people should not be treated as mere objects, for they are, as 
rational and autonomous beings, their own ends with own goals and their 
                 Chapter 1: General Introduction  
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individual ways of working towards those goals (Korsgaard, 1996). This implies that 
people thus be treated as ends-in-themselves – an implication of fundamental 
importance for social interaction and the prevention of using other humans as 
mere means. Taken together, moral autonomy thus means that people are self-
governed and able to set own ends, make decisions which are freely based on 
rational and therefore moral reasons. For example, stealing someone's money 
would be equal to using another person as a mere means (because that person is 
used to achieve one's own goal – which  is to get the person’s money) and 
therefore contradicts with Kant’s concept of humanity as it violates the second 
formula of the CI (Bowie, 1999). This emphasizes that the CI not only focusses on 
a moral agent’s actions but on his or her underlying intentions for action which is 
often contrasted with the principles of utilitarianism2.  
 One crucial aspect of Kant’s moral psychology refers to the ratio of moral 
action and the satisfaction of personal desires: The CI – characterized as an 
objective, rationally binding and normative principle – must be adhered to, even 
if it contradicts human desires or inclinations (Johnson & Cureton, 2019).  
 The hypothetical imperative (HI), to the contrary, is conditional in nature, 
which is due to the fact that an agent’s action is not based on a maxim of actions 
but on the respective goal (If you want x than do y). For example: If a person strives 
 
 
 
2 The principle of utilitarianism implies that morality is determined by the consequences of an 
action. For example, following the principles of utiliarism it is acceptable to harm others if this harm 
towards one or few people would increase the well-being of a greater number of people (Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013) whereas the principle of deontology (as in CI) states that morality is 
determined by the intrinsic nature (e.g. regardless of the consequences it is wrong to harm others).  
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for good grades in school, he or she should study; if a person longs to have a lot of 
money, he or she should choose the adequate profession. But if the person loses 
interest in good grades or money, they can choose to stop studying or working 
(Johnson & Cureton, 2019; Sensen, 2013). The CI, on the other hand, states that 
moral norms do not exist in relation to certain interests, but apply to everyone and 
unconditionally, (i.e. categorically).   
 Autonomy and Morality in Psychology   
While moral autonomy plays a decisive role in philosophy, psychological research 
focuses primarily on autonomy in the sense of personal autonomy. While the 
Kantian concept of autonomy includes an autonomous person whose will is 
completely free from all personal interests (Taylor, 2005), personal autonomy 
describes the ability to make independent decisions and pursue one's own 
approach to life - often independently of a moral content.   
 In social psychology, scholars describe autonomous action as the 
individual's preferred and freely chosen option (Deci & Ryan, 1987). The term 
choice is used as an “organismic concept anchored in the sense of a fuller, more 
integrated functioning. The more autonomous the behavior, the more it is 
endorsed by the whole self and is experienced as action for which one is 
responsible” (Deci & Ryan, 1987, p. 1025). The relevance of intentional choice 
making is also highlighted in cultural psychology. According to Tomasello and 
colleagues (2005), autonomy is understood as the freedom of intentional choice 
between possible options in order to achieve means that are relevant for the 
individual. An intentional agent chooses an action that leads to a specific 
predefined goal whereas the respective outcome might, or might not, match with 
this original goal.   
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 In developmental psychology a well-known concept that deals with the 
psychological interrelation of autonomy and morality stems from Piaget (1932, 
1954) who proposed (based on behavioral observations and clinical interviews) a 
prominent constructivist theory 3  about children's cognitive and moral 
development. Through the analysis of transformations in children's reasoning 
about moral concerns, he identified three stages of moral development which 
start with a first phase of relative moral unconcernedness followed by two main 
stages of moral thinking: heteronomous morality (moral realism) and autonomous 
morality (moral relativism). Heteronomous morality – in the Piagetian 
understanding – means that morality is imposed from outside. Children at this 
stage of moral development accept rules made by an authority and know that 
breaking the rules will lead to sanction. The next stage of moral development – 
which Piaget thought would develop at 9 to 10 years of age – is the stage of 
autonomous morality which implicates one’s own moral rules and the recognition 
of no absolute right and wrong. Here, the autonomous content of morality refers 
to the freedom of moral relativism. At this stage of moral development, the child 
develops an understanding about the arbitrariness of rules and the mechanisms 
of changing them, for example through consensus with a group. This transition 
from heteronomous morality (i.e., that is shaped by the expectation of external 
sanctions and rewards) to autonomous morality (i.e., that is based on one’s own 
intention) is mirrored in children’s moral judgments. These moral judgments 
 
 
 
 
 
3 According to Piaget's theory of constructivism, it is the experience that leads to the production of 
knowledge and meaning.  
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initially focus on the consequences of an action, but as children grow older, they 
begin to take underlying intentions into account (Carpendale, 2000; Piaget, 1932). 
Kohlberg (1976, 1981) picked up on Piagetian thoughts and postulated a related 
but more complex stage model of moral development. Kohlberg identified six 
stages of children’s moral development: They evolve from an early stage of 
heteronomous moral understanding, which is shaped by the standards of adults 
and the consequences of violating (or following) their rules, to a morality of 
universalizable, general ethical principles. In his research, Kohlberg (1976, 1981) 
describes the internalization of heteronomous moral standards and group norms 
which lead to individual reasoning and judgments about what is right and wrong. 
In the final stages people are capable of an own set of moral guidelines (which not 
necessarily have to fit the law).  
 From a cultural-psychological perspective, Tomasello (2019) understands 
morality as a normative concept that grounds on human-specific forms of 
cooperation. He strongly emphasizes the role of cooperation and socio-cultural 
interaction in the moral and cognitive development of children (Nungesser, 2011). 
Since this approach is highly relevant for the further course of this dissertation, 
the following chapter examines morality in the context of normative social 
phenomena and discusses the crucial role of shared intentionality and cultural 
learning.  
1.2 Normative Social Phenomena  
The present chapter contains a conceptual approach to normativity and deals with 
deontic and evaluative normative concepts. Different types of norms will be 
discussed with reference to social domain theory – which includes the distinction 
between conventional and moral norms.   
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 Normative social phenomena denote the human characteristic to create 
own “laws” which regulate social life including human cooperation, collaboration, 
social institutions, and cultural knowledge (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Chudek & 
Henrich, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2016). The deontic 
concept of normativity (from Greek deon, meaning which is binding) refers to what 
one “ought” to do, including the differentiation between right or wrong as well as 
personal obligations or permissions: We “ought” to perform certain actions; we 
have normative expectations about what people ought to do in certain situations 
(Chudek & Henrich, 2011). Evaluative or axiological concepts of normativity (from 
Latin valores or Greek axios, both meaning which has worth) concern evaluation 
of an action, for instance, if something is considered good or bad (Dancy, 2000). 
According to Tappolet (2014), the distinction between evaluative and deontic 
concepts of normativity lies in a generalization of the traditional differentiation 
between what is good and what is right. Both concepts include certain 
expectations about other’s actions – which may be of descriptive or normative 
kind. Descriptive expectations have a mind-to-world direction of fit, e.g. a belief 
how someone is going to behave in a certain situation (Searle, 1983; Wellman & 
Miller, 2008). For example, based on previous information, person X thinks that 
person Y is going to perform action Z. Normative expectations have a world-
tomind direction of fit, e.g. a desire how one ought to behave in a certain situation 
(Searle, 1983; Wellman & Miller, 2008). For example, based on normative 
expectations, person x thinks that person y ought to perform action z.   
 Normative social phenomena are classified into different types of norms. 
Instrumental norms refer to instrumental rationality in the sense of Kant's 
hypothetical imperative and specify how to reach practical goals (e.g., Kant, 
1785/1991). These norms gain force through the rational means used for achieving 
a certain goal (Copp, 2006; Lorini, 2015). Epistemic norms aim at a person’s beliefs, 
which in particular have been studied by philosophers as the subject of epistemic 
                 Chapter 1: General Introduction  
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normativity. Epistemic norms determine what beliefs one should hold, e.g. what 
we ought to say, do or think from an epistemic point of view (Fedra, 2018; Graham, 
2015). Psychology basically focusses on practical norms which concern the 
evaluation of actions like human cultural practices and institutions with normative 
structures. They have a deontic structure and regulate human interactions by 
providing certain guidelines (Popitz, 2006) or reasons about how to behave in 
certain contexts (Kalish, 2002; Searle, 2001). Practical norms include social norms 
– labeled as the “glue” of human societies – that concern human cooperation and 
interaction within groups (Elster, 1989; Tomasello, 2011). As human cooperation 
is unique and crucially complex, social norms serve as important stabilization for 
daily interactions. They form standards of ‘appropriate’ behavior and are accepted 
by members of the group (Fritsche, 2002; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt & 
Tomasello, 2012; Searle, 2010). The fact that children acquire those norms from 
their social environment stabilizes the group in the long run (Chudek & Henrich, 
2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; M. J. Rossano, 2012). People not only recognize 
and acknowledge social norms (Searle, 2010), but have also established strategies 
to enforce them, if necessary, by sanctions or rewards from agent-neutral third-
party executives (Brandom, 1994). The sanctioning of norm violations may be 
performed by external forces or social pressure (Tomasello, 2009) or by internal 
sanctions such as feeling guilt or shame due to transgressions of norms (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009; Tomasello, 2009).   
 Within social norm psychology and philosophy, a common distinction is 
made between moral norms and conventional norms (Tisak & Turiel, 1988; Turiel, 
1983, 2006). According to social domain theory, morality is seen as a individual 
system or organized domain of social knowledge that develops distinctly from 
concepts of social conventions (Smetana, 2013). Moral norms concern issues such 
as personal welfare, justice or harm and are considered universal and nonarbitrary 
(Smetana, 2006; Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2013). They are regarded as 
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‘prototypes’ of social norms because they are in line with humans’ natural aversion 
to harm and natural tendency to help others (Nichols, 2004; Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). One might say that the violation of moral 
norms carries most normative weight than conventional norm transgressions (M. 
J. Rossano, 2012) because their violation might be a serious issue (Turiel, 1983). 
Moral norms are important for the maintenance of human cooperation, because 
they are considered to suppress immediate self-interest (Krebs, 2008). 
Conventional norms, on the contrary, concern arbitrary rules of correct or 
appropriate behavior in a given situation or social practice (e.g., waiting in line at 
the supermarket checkout or wearing black to a funeral). Although conventional 
norms help to structure society and group living, their violation does not involve 
direct harm or victimization (Turiel, 1983).   
 Now that we explored the concept of normative social phenomena, we will 
focus on collective intentionality to understand how the capacity to process such 
complex social information evolved. The next chapter will investigate collective 
intentionality as the base of human normativity, including moral norms and the 
(descriptive or normative) expectation of other’s (prosocial) behavior.  
1.3 Collective Intentionality   
Much research has focused on how social norms and cultural practices came into 
existence (e.g., Gilbert, 2008; Göckeritz, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014; Rakoczy & 
Schmidt, 2013; Searle, 1983, 1995; Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, 
Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012). In order to understand the role of collective 
intentionality in that context, it is useful to look more closely at the evolution of 
human cooperation and group life, starting with an examination of human cultural 
practices.   
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 While many animal species live in complex social groups, humans are the 
only species living in cultures (Tomasello, 1999). Normative actions, such as social 
practices and moral norms are an inherent part of human culture (Bruner, 1993). 
Specific forms of social and cultural interaction performed by early Homo Sapiens 
were crucial to the development and evolution of our species. According to 
Tomasello and colleagues (2012), human-specific social interactions – including 
unique forms of cooperation, cognition, communication – derive from the 
requirement and evolutionary advantage of collaboration. As efficient 
collaborative foragers, humans became interdependent on one another, which led 
to growing interest in the well-being of social partners and social selection against 
cheaters. This motivation for collaboration (as an evolutionary benefitting trait) 
initiated cooperative interactions which required to share mental states like a 
common goal (e.g., “we” build a hideout for the night). The mechanism underlying 
this motivation and capacity to share mental states and pursue a common goal is 
called shared or joint intentionality, also described as “we”-intentionality which 
refers to participants who share psychological states (Searle, 1995; Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2007; Tuomela, 2003). Shared or joined intentionality requires 
powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning (Tomasello et al., 2005). 
Cultural learning means that humans “culturally” learn through another individual 
and their perspectives of the world. Hereby it is important that the learner 
considers the individual they learn from as an intentional agent who pursues a 
certain goal and who is estimated to attend to aspects that are relevant to these 
goals (Boesch, 1993). The understanding of other people as intentional agents 
enables cultural learning as well as a shared intentionality. This descriptive 
understanding of the mental states of others is investigated in research on the 
socalled theory of mind (Sodian et al., 2016; Wellman & Liu, 2004) which describes 
the psychological concept of assigning mental states to others and to ourselves 
including what we know, think and feel (Perner, 1999).   
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 The capacity to create a joint agent of “we” with others provides the 
opportunity to take others’ perspectives into account on a recursive dual-level 
structure. This dual-level structure facilitates second-personal relations to others 
as coequal partners. Thus, joint intentionality leads to human-unique capacities of 
sharing and aligning psychological states like emotions, goals, attention and 
knowledge (Tomasello, 2019). As the number of human individuals increased, so 
did the need to collaborate, not just with other individuals but with a group (e.g., 
in competition with other groups). Cultural conventions, institutions and norms 
derived from a group-mindedness called collective intentionality (Tomasello & 
Rakoczy, 2003). The mutual interdependence led to social and therefore 
evolutionary advantage of individuals who provided the required properties of 
collaborative motivation and prosocial attributes like altruism. The resulting 
sociocultural activities (i.e., involving commitments and expectations) culminated 
into human normativity in the sense of obligations and entitlements (Gilbert, 
2008; Searle, 2001, 2010). As a result, the internalization of generalized collective 
conventions and norms nowadays regulate individual behavior and build a new 
form of social rationality, which Searle (2001) describes as desire-independent 
reasons for action – or morality. Taken together, the evolutionary advantage of 
skills that enable large scale cooperation between genetically unrelated 
individuals led to the evolution of human specific social competencies (like shared 
and collective intentionality and cultural learning) and to the implementation and 
enforcement of social norms through mechanisms of sanctions and rewards.   
 An important aspect is the link between collective intentionality and 
human morality. According to Tomasello (2018a) morality is a special form of 
human cooperation that emanated to enable individuals to function effectively in 
their cooperative activities and relationships with others. It is argued that the 
ability of joint intentionality carries the seeds of morality as a second-person 
morality with cooperative partners (Tomasello, 2018a). From an evolutionary 
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point of view, it makes that the individual felt sympathy and cared for his partner, 
so that the partner was in good shape for future activities (e.g. collaboration, 
hunting). Also in the regard of partner choice it was advantageous to be seen as a 
motivated collaborative partner – which made individuals concerned with their 
reputation (Tomasello, 2016a, 2018a). A reputation represents a group’s collective 
and public judgment of a given person in the sense of a shared evaluation that is 
anchored in a common ground, of how “we” think of someone (Engelmann & 
Rapp, 2018). A way to manage this reputation is to engage in prosocial actions, 
meaning actions which not only derive from personal desires, but from 
normatively moral reasons (Jensen, Vaish, & Schmidt, 2014). Combining Chapter 
1.2 and 1.3 it becomes clear that humans have a specific interest in cooperative 
activities and also in morally relevant actions from a first-party as well as from a 
third-party stance. The next chapter will provide deeper insight on human specific 
prosocial actions, focusing on the development of children’s own prosocial actions 
(such as sharing) as well as on their descriptive and normative expectations about 
others’ prosocial behavior.  
1.4 Prosociality   
Prosocial behavior is defined as proactive and reactive response to the needs of 
others with the aim to promote their well-being – which plays a fundamental role 
in social interaction and cooperation (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). Prosocial actions 
concern acts of helping, sharing, and comforting others, and they are closely 
interrelated with normativity and morality (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Jensen et al., 
2014). Prosocial behavior may – but does not necessarily – involve personal costs; 
but it can also benefit the actor or come with neither cost nor gain (Hastings, 
Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007).   
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 An aspect that is special in the animal kingdom is the fact that humans do 
not just show prosocial behavior towards kin but also towards nonrelatives 
(Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Jensen et al., 2014). Seemingly trivial actions such as 
donating money to homeless people on the street or offering a seat to an elderly 
person on the bus are uniquely human and particularly unusual compared to other 
species (Jensen et al., 2014). As already pointed out in Chapter 1.3, the interest in 
cooperation, morality and prosocial behavior can be traced back to their 
evolutionary benefits. Consequently, the ability for peaceful, well-coordinated 
interactions with relatives and strangers and the exhibition of highly prosocial 
behavior and habits has earned humans the (self-created) label of being ultrasocial 
(Jensen et al., 2014; Richerson & Boyd, 1998). Within their ultrasocial traits, Jensen 
and colleagues (2014) identified three important aspects of human prosociality: 
First, the facility to care for others’ welfare, second, the cognitive and empathetic 
understanding of others’ feelings, and third, the ability to infer, understand and 
enforce social norms. These uniquely human psychological mechanisms of 
affective perspective taking lead to prosocial actions like helping and sharing. 
While helping predominantly requires the cost of energy, sharing involves 
personal costs – so that an intrinsic motivation to share with others might be 
intimidated by a selfish desire for the resources (Tomasello, 2016a). However, 
research shows that even preschoolers have an intrinsic motivation to help or 
share with others (Ulber, Hamann, & Tomasello, 2016; Warneken & Tomasello, 
2008) and that – in the course of preschool years – certain aspects gain importance 
regarding children’s prosocial actions. In the following section, an empirical 
overview will provide important information about children’s normative 
understanding, their prosocial decisions and their expectations about others’ 
prosocial behavior, with regard to the underlying mechanisms of cultural learning 
and collective intentionality.   
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1.5 Empirical Overview  
The general aim of this dissertation was to examine the roots of moral autonomy 
through the building blocks of normativity, prosociality and choice. Therefore, the 
following chapter provides an overview of empirical studies that examined 
different aspects of those building blocks. The chapter focusses on the ontogeny 
of children’s normative understanding and will introduce relevant research on 
children’s own prosocial behavior and their prosocial expectations about others’ 
prosocial actions.  
 Children’s Understanding of Social Norms   
Since social norms and human cooperation are largely based on the competence 
of collective intentionality (see Chapter 1.3), this chapter starts with an overview 
of the ontogeny of this ability in preschool years.  
 Children’s understanding of social norms and their communicative skills 
are grounded in the capacity to understand others as intentional agents. At the 
end of the first year of life this skill enables children to understand and 
(linguistically) communicate with their social environment (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 
2003). Moll and colleagues (2008) found that children at 12 to 14 months of age 
can use joint intention situations to draw inferences about a common ground. 
Joint attention situations describe the attention to a common object or event 
outside a dyad while being aware of the shared focus (Abels & Hutman, 2015; 
Ahnert, 2014). The authors compared two conditions in which an adult was equally 
familiar with an object. In one condition, the infant and the adult initially 
interacted with the object together, while in the other condition the adult 
interacted with the object alone (i.e., the child observed it from a distance). When 
the adult (who looked at all objects ambiguously) then pretended to recognize one 
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of the objects and asked for it, 14-month-old infants assumed that the inquiry was 
directed at the object that they had shared. This study furthermore revealed that 
children at 14 months of age understand that a joint goal structures joint attention 
(and that each partner knows that the other is focused on things which favor the 
joint goal), which leads to participation in uniquely human forms of social and 
collective intentionality.   
 At two years of age, children participate in more complex shared 
intentionality activities. Shared or collective intentionality is the ability and 
motivation to engage with others in collaborative, co-operative activities with joint 
goals and intentions. It also implies that the collaborators’ psychological processes 
are jointly directed at something and take place within a joint attentional frame 
(Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Tomasello et al., 2005). In activities with common 
intentionality one can a) react to the actions of another and b) have intentions 
towards the intentions of others (Searle, 1995). Warneken and colleagues (2006) 
found that 2year-old children were able to interact in cooperative interactions that 
demonstrate such a form of shared intentionality. They demonstrated that 
children at 24 months of age coordinated their actions with an adult partner and 
showed attempts to regulate the partner’s action during interruptions. The 
participants furthermore actively communicated to the adult in an obvious 
attempt to request his reengagement. This means that the participants had a joint 
goal (to get a toy) and developed joint intentions (i.e., a plan) to achieve this goal. 
This illustrates that shared intentionality enables children to take different 
perspectives on things which is highly important to engage in numerous cultural 
activities (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Whereas joint intentionality enables 
participation in collaborative activities involving two (or a few) agents, collective 
intentionality enables collaborative activities with or between groups. At around 
the third birthday, children develop a so called “we” intentionality that is required 
for coordinated interactions between groups of individuals. This emerging 
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understanding of and adherence to social norms is labeled as the normative turn 
(Tomasello, 2018b). This normative turn is assessed through the investigation of 
children’s expectations and reactions to the norm-conforming or norm-
nonconforming behavior of a third party. Besides interviews (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 
1978) and eye-tracking studies (e.g., Hamlin, 2013; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011), 
researchers created so called protest paradigms to assess children’s verbal and 
non-verbal reactions to norm-transgressions (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 
2008). Schmidt and colleagues (2013) furthermore invented a counter-protest 
paradigm that focusses on children’s normative understanding of others’ 
entitlements 4 . Children’s normative understanding can also be measured by 
punishment, reward (e.g., enforcement of fairness norms) or evaluation of an 
agent who has performed a particular norm-conforming or non-norm-conforming 
action (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013).   
 Using the research methods presented above, it was found that children 
between 2 and 3 years of age do not only follow social norms, but also enforce 
them through protest, sanctioning, criticism and teaching (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013; Rakoczy et al., 2008; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). This protest was shown 
as a reaction to norm transgressions in different contexts, for instance, concerning 
conventional games (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011) 
and morally relevant actions (F. Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011; Schmidt, 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012; Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). Children infer 
norms after being explicitly “taught” by an adult that “this is how it’s done”, but 
they also learn generic and normative knowledge in pedagogical and also in non-
pedagogical contexts (Butler & Markman, 2012; Butler, Schmidt, Bürgel, & 
 
 
4 Norms create not only obligations, but also entitlements. While obligations refer to expectations 
about specific behavior in certain circumstances, entitlements denote the fact that persons are 
authorized by the group to act in certain manner in certain circumstances (Searle, 2010).  
                 Chapter 1: General Introduction  
  
24 
Tomasello, 2015; Schmidt et al., 2011). Children even infer norms when the action 
is arbitrary or without obvious purpose (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 
2016) and are therefore open to over-interpretation about how “we” do things 
(Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Searle, 1995). Preschoolers distinguish between 
moral and conventional norms on different dimensions (Josephs, Kushnir, 
Gräfenhain, & Rakoczy, 2016; Josephs & Rakoczy, 2016; Smetana et al., 2013) and 
refer to moral norm transgressions as being more severe as conventional norm 
violations (Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983). Three-year-old children show sensitivity 
to context-relativity of conventional norms (Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2009) and understand that they might vary between cultures (Schmidt 
et al., 2012). As a conclusion, at the third year of life, social norms and normative 
actions begin to encompass acts that are performed because they are supposed 
to be the right thing to do or ought to be done in a certain way (Tomasello, 2018b). 
This oughtness of conventional activities (like waiting in line at the supermarket) 
or moral actions (like prosocial actions such as helping or sharing) emerges with 
the capacity of collective intentionality and is based on an obligation to do so. The 
following chapter will examine children’s emerging prosociality with a focus on the 
normative turn, which leads to a sense of obligation replacing sympathy (see 
Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) as a reason for prosocial action.  
 Prosociality and Choice   
Children show remarkable prosocial tendencies from an early age. At about 14 
months, children engage in prosocial helping (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) and 
begin to share resources from around the age of 2 (Brownell, Svetlova, & Nichols, 
2009). Roessler and Perner (2015) emphasize that prosocially helping a person is 
to be distinguished from helping in a merely causal sense. They refer to Svetlova 
and colleagues (2010) who distinguish between instrumental, action-based 
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helping (e.g., helping to complete an action), empathic, emotion-based helping 
(e.g., helping others who are in emotional distress) and altruistic, costly helping 
(e.g., sharing an object). They found that it was easier for children at 18 and 30 
months of age to engage in instrumental helping than emotional and altruistic 
helping. This means that toddlers tend to engage in empathic helping somewhat 
later than in instrumental helping, whereas altruistic helping was most difficult 
(Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). Altruistic helping, like children’s sharing 
behavior, is a key behavior of the human species (Knafo & Plomin, 2006) and 
therefore a common method of studying children’s prosocial development during 
preschool years. Contextual features like resource value (Blake & Rand, 2010) or 
the individual involvement in resource earning and sharing (Warneken, Lohse, 
Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) influence the amount of shared resources.   
 An important aspect of children’s prosocial actions is factor of choice 
(Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013; Rapp, Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2017), a 
concept that children understand relatively early in preschool years (Chernyak, 
Kushnir, Sullivan, & Wang, 2013). Chernyak and Kushnir (2013) investigated the 
role of choice in the context of preschoolers’ prosocial sharing decisions. They 
found that children who were given costly alternatives shared more with a new 
individual, which suggests that children rationally infer their prosociality through 
the process of making difficult, autonomous choices. The authors referred their 
results to self-perception theory, suggesting that individuals are likely to act in 
congruence with their past actions because of a desire to stay self-consistent. Rapp 
and colleagues (2017) identified a similar effect of choice on helping behavior, 
referring to children’s intentional decision to help or not to help.   
 With the normative turn (see Chapter 1.5.1) at around 3 years of age, the 
idea of fairness derives from the obligation to treat others fairly (Tomasello, 2019). 
Children not only begin to feel obligations to behave in a certain way, but also 
begin to form expectations about others’ prosocial actions (Tomasello, 2018b). 
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However, although children expect prosocial behavior of third parties form early 
age, they do not necessarily follow fairness norms until the end of preschool years 
(LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, 
Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010), a phenomenon that is labeled as the knowledge-
behavior gap (Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014).   
 Smith and colleagues (2013) investigated the discrepancy of preschoolers’ 
endorsement of fairness norms related to their contradicting actions when given 
a chance to share. They found that children from 3-8 years of age stated that they 
should share equally but failed to engage in those equal sharing decisions until 78 
years of age. It was furthermore found that 3- to 4-year-old children correctly 
predicted that they would advantage themselves, which rules out the assumption 
of a failure of willpower, in the actual situation (Smith et al., 2013). This means 
that young children knew about fairness norms but accurately predicted they own 
self-favoring future actions. Thus, they are not only competent in making accurate 
predictions about themselves, but also about others’ future actions, even if these 
behavioral expectations about others did not match evaluations about the way 
human social actors should behave (DeJesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, 2014).   
 In summary, there is evidence that instrumental and personal prosocial 
behavior as well as the costly altruistic sharing emerges and increases in the course 
of preschool years. The aspect of choice and intentional action play important 
roles in children’s prosocial decisions. Within preschool years, children begin to 
form normative and descriptive expectations about others’ future actions. This 
knowledge forms the integral basis for the next chapter, which will present the 
focus of the dissertation and the methodological approach of the empirical 
studies.  
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1.6 Focus of the Dissertation and Methodological Approach   
The general aim of this dissertation is to examine the roots of moral autonomy 
using an empirical approach that focuses on important building blocks of the topic: 
children’s own prosocial actions (i.e., children’s costly sharing decisions) and their 
normative and descriptive expectations about others’ prosocial behavior based on 
mechanisms of (collective) intentionality (i.e., intentional choice versus coercion), 
and cultural learning in morally relevant contexts. Therefore, this dissertation will 
examine the following three research questions:  
 
(1) Do children enforce agreed-upon prosocial sharing norms in a norm-creation 
paradigm?  
(2) Does observed intentional choice increase preschoolers’ prosocial sharing 
decisions?   
(3) Do preschoolers expect prosocial actions from others who had shared 
voluntarily (not involuntarily) before?  
  
 In Study 1, a group dictator game was used to assess if preschoolers 
enforce agreed-upon prosocial versus selfish sharing norms. Three- and 5-year-old 
children and two hand puppets had the opportunity to agree on how to distribute 
resources between themselves and a group of passive recipients. It was assessed 
(a) if children agreed on a prosocial versus selfish sharing norm, (b) if children 
enforced agreed-upon prosocial versus selfish sharing norms, (c) if children 
engaged in agreed-upon sharing norms even if group conformity was 
compromised, and (d) how they evaluated the proposer of a prosocial or selfish 
agreement. According to literature on moral norm violations (Hardecker, Schmidt, 
Roden, & Tomasello, 2016; Josephs & Rakoczy, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2011), it was 
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hypothesized that 5-year-old preschoolers would stipulate and enforce prosocial 
– but not selfish – sharing norms, adhere to a prosocial sharing norms and that 
they would assess the proposer of a prosocial distribution better than the one who 
had proposed the selfish distribution of resources.  
 Study Set 2 assessed if observed choice increases children’s own prosocial 
sharing decisions. In three between-subject conditions, the participants observed 
an agent who either (a) made a costly choice (i.e., sharing instead of keeping the 
item), (b) made a non-costly choice (i.e., sharing instead of watching the item be 
thrown away), or (c) had no choice (i.e., being instructed to share). Then, children 
were given the opportunity to decide how many stickers (out of three) they would 
like to share with a sad animal puppet. Chernyak and Kushnir (2013) had found 
that choice increases preschoolers’ sharing behavior. Due to mechanisms of 
cultural learning, collective intentionality and children’s promiscuous tendency to 
infer social norms from intentional action (Butler & Markman, 2012; Schmidt, 
Butler, et al., 2016), children in the current study were expected to engage in more 
prosocial sharing themselves after having observed an intentional prosocial agent 
in the costly-choice condition.   
 Study 3 investigated preschoolers’ descriptive expectations about the 
causal agent of prosocial and selfish actions, based on agents’ prior history of 
voluntary versus involuntary prosocial behavior. With reference to previous 
research on children’s evaluations and expectations on others future actions, 
(DeJesus et al., 2014) it was assumed that older preschoolers would use 
information about the circumstances and underlying intentions of agents’ prior 
prosocial actions to form descriptive, third-party expectations about their current 
morally relevant sharing behavior.   
 The link between the presented studies and the goal to investigate 
important building blocks of Kant’s moral autonomy appears as follows: The group 
dictator game of Study 1 included a norm creation paradigm and served to 
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investigate if children were willing to do "the right thing", which means to establish 
a prosocial norm even if this prosocial norm involved personal costs. The study 
furthermore intended to reveal children’s normative expectations about the 
(costly) prosocial behavior of other members of the group. The setup of Study Set 
2 aimed to investigate another aspect of moral autonomy which focusses of the 
importance of intentions and circumstances of morally relevant actions. It was 
assessed if preschoolers were sensitive to the intentionality of a prosocial action, 
that is, if an agent acted prosocially because of an intrinsic prosocial intention to 
share or if they were coerced to behave prosocial. This investigation was of 
decisive importance for the research question of this dissertation, since morally 
autonomous actors in the Kantian understanding carry out moral actions on their 
own initiative. Therefore, possible effects on children’s own prosocial actions 
(Study Set 2) as well as their descriptive expectations about others’ prosocial 
versus selfish decisions (Study 3) were assessed.   
 The following methodological approaches were chosen: The first study 
consisted of a behavioral protest paradigm, the second study was based on the 
examination of children's own sharing decisions, and the third study was a forced 
choice paradigm. In summary, the research paradigms of all three studies were 
based on established empirical methods. The main measures were the children's 
own prosocial actions and their normative and descriptive expectations of the 
prosocial and selfish behavior of others.   
  
                 Chapter 2: Study 1  
  
30 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Study 1: Preschoolers Enforce Prosocial Sharing Norms in a  
Group Dictator Game 
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Abstract  
Young children understand and care about moral norms, enforce them, and 
negatively evaluate selfish behavior and unfairness. Whereas some research has 
found that preschoolers tend to be rather selfish when it comes to sharing 
resources, other research shows that even very young children can act prosocially. 
However, it is not known whether children understand agreed-upon selfish versus 
prosocial sharing norms as binding. To address these questions, we used a group 
dictator game in a norm creation paradigm and investigated whether 3- and 5year-
old children would stipulate and enforce selfish versus prosocial sharing norms.   
 Children and two puppets had the opportunity to agree upon either a 
prosocial norm (i.e., each group member should share with a child from another 
kindergarten) or a selfish norm (i.e., no sharing with another child). To investigate 
if children understood the suggested norm as binding, the target puppet either 
followed or violated the suggested norm, and we measured children’s 
spontaneous protest against the target puppet’s sharing behavior. We found that 
5-year-olds (but not younger children) enforced prosocial – but not selfish – 
sharing norms. These results indicate that, in a morally relevant situation, novel 
norms gain their normative force not only through agreement or expectations of 
conformity, but also through considerations of the content of the proposed norm.  
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2.1 Introduction  
 Human Cooperation and Group Life  
When people do things, they tend to be guided by how the group does them or 
how things are expected to be done by others (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). This is 
due to the fact that modern humans are characterized by a psychology that 
supports large, cooperative societies (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Within these 
societies, humans agree to bind themselves to social norms (Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012). In these culturally evolved cooperative social environments, moral systems 
enforced by sanctions and rewards led to the evolution of other-regarding motives 
like empathy and social emotions (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Whereas some 
research has found that preschoolers tend to be rather selfish when it comes to 
sharing resources (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Smith et al., 2013), other 
research shows that even very young children can act in a prosocial and helpful 
manner (Kuhlmeier, Dunfield, & Neill, 2014; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). From 3 years of age onwards, children have 
knowledge and expectations about fairness (Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014). 
They care about moral norms, enforce them, and negatively evaluate selfish 
behavior and unfairness (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Rakoczy, Kaufmann, & Lohse, 
2016; Vaish et al., 2011). Children defend game and moral norm violations by 
protesting against a transgressor or, for instance, by teaching the ‘‘right’’ way to 
do it (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2011).   
 Whereas Piaget (1932) estimated young children merely to be norm-
followers, the results of Schmidt and colleagues (2016) led to the presumption that 
children do not just passively acquire social norms from adult behavior and 
instruction; rather, they have a natural and proactive tendency to infer from an "is 
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state" to an "ought state”. Thus, children as promiscuous normativists (Schmidt, 
Butler, et al., 2016) do not only quickly acquire social norms by observing other 
people's actions, but also quickly and actively construct a social norm from a single 
action, even if it does not exist in the actor's mind or in the culture as a whole 
(Nichols, 2004; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009).   
 (Novel) Group Norms   
Cooperation and group-conformity serve a crucially important function in the 
transmission of human culture (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Henrich & Boyd, 1998). 
Human children already have a strong motivation to equalize their behavior and 
their opinions to those of peers or the cultural group (Haun & Tomasello, 2011; 
Henrich & Boyd, 1998). They show a socially motivated agreement with the 
consensus majority against their own first judgment (Kim, Chen, Smetana, & 
Greenberger, 2016) – a phenomenon that is labeled as strong conformity (Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011) and tends to be found predominantly in social-conventional and 
visual tasks. Engelmann and colleagues (Engelmann, Herrmann, Rapp, & 
Tomasello, 2016) investigated whether children would conform to an antisocial 
majority or do the right thing at personal cost of rewards and peer pressure. They 
found that if a recipient is in need, 5-year-olds’ prosocial motivation prevails over 
conformity, and that they sacrifice material and social benefits in order to act 
morally. Kim and colleagues (2016) compared the conformity of children with the 
group consensus in moral, social-conventional and visual tasks. At preschool age, 
compliance was found in all three areas, but compliance was significantly higher 
for social-conventional stimuli than for moral and visual stimuli.  
 Schmidt and colleagues (2016) investigated how novel norms can be 
stipulated in a group context. Therefore, they investigated the role of collective 
agreement in a norm creation paradigm and found that children from 3 years of 
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age understand something about the role of agreement in establishing mutually 
binding social norms, but that their notion of norm formation is confined to 
conditions of unanimity.   
 The Group Dictator Game   
Other popular methods for the investigation of group dynamics in relation to 
prosocial behavior come from experimental economic research such as the 
ultimatum (UG) or dictator game (DG). In the UG, one player – the proposer – is 
endowed with an amount of resources which have to be split with a second player. 
The proposer communicates a proposal which may be accepted or rejected by the 
responder. If the responder accepts, the money is split in the proposed way; if the 
responder rejects, both players receive nothing (Ockenfels & Erlei, 2018). DG’s are 
particularly suitable methods to examine other cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie sharing decisions (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994). They have 
two players, one of whom, the dictator, can decide unilaterally how a certain 
amount of resources is distributed. The recipient thus assumes a purely passive 
role. In contrast to economic textbook theory, the adult dictators do not keep the 
entire amount of money for themselves but averagely 20% of the original 
endowment (Erlei, 2018). Team or Group dictator games (GDG) represent the 
transfer of DG’s into a social context: Several agents decide together how to 
distribute resources between themselves and a group of passive recipients (Cason 
& Mui, 1997). While money is used as a resource in must adult studies, child 
research uses stickers or similar valuable resources (Benenson, Pascoe, & 
Radmore, 2007; Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010).  
 Adult research reveals contrasting information about the effects of group 
dynamics on individual versus collective sharing patterns in dictator games. On the 
one hand, Luhan and colleagues (2009) found evidence that groups were more 
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selfish than individuals in a within-subjects design and that the most selfish group 
member had the greatest impact on sharing behavior within the group. These 
findings are in line with a meta-analysis of Engel (2011) as well as research of the 
ultimatum game which shows that groups are willing to transfer and accept 
smaller amounts of resources (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). Cason and Mui (1997), on 
the other hand, reported that teams are more altruistic than individuals in the 
dictator game and that team decisions tend to be driven by the more altruistic 
team member. The explanation of their results refers to social comparison theory 
(SCT) which states that team participants tend to present themselves in a socially 
desirable way. This leads to a modified behavior which appears more in line with 
the perceived social norms.  
 Literature reveals that children who play economic games prefer fair 
distribution, especially when it comes to the perspective of a third person (Blake 
et al., 2014). But when children themselves are involved, they tend to reject 
injustices only if they were unfavorable, but not if they were beneficial to 
themselves (LoBue et al., 2011; Takagishi et al., 2010). Dictator games at preschool 
age reveal that children favor themselves until 7 years of age (Benenson et al., 
2007; Blake & Rand, 2010; Gummerum et al., 2010). Blake & McAuliffe (2011) ran 
a mini-ultimatum game with children from 4 to 8 years of age and assumed distinct 
mechanisms that underlie the development of two forms of inequity aversion: 
Until the age of 7, participants rejected disadvantageous offers while accepting 
advantageous offers. Children from 8 years of age rejected both forms of inequity. 
 Benonzio and Diesendruck (2015) investigated 3- to 6-year-old children’s 
sharing behavior in a dictator game and assessed the development of their 
reliance on resource ownership, recipients’ group membership and individual- 
versus group-regarding preferences. They found that boys favored the in-group 
and did not preserve common resources different from their own resources. 
Children complied with in-group members’ preferences and boys additionally 
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opposed to out-group members’ preferences. In a study that examined fairness 
norms in relation to sharing behavior, children aged 3 to 8 years testified that both 
– they and others – should distribute fairly. However, they did not distribute 
resources equally until 7 to 8 years of age. Taken together, although children from 
the age of 3 years are aware of fairness norms, it is only with increasing age that 
they are able to comply with these norms and bear the personal costs of 
compliance (Smith et al., 2013).   
 Current Study  
The current study investigates whether preschoolers would bind themselves on 
prosocial sharing norms through agreement in a norm creation paradigm. One 
child and two hand puppets agreed on how to distribute stickers between 
themselves and a group of passive recipients. The study was assessed with 3- and 
5-year-old children because important conceptual and performance skills related 
to theory of mind, normativity and executive control develop at this age (Perner 
& Roessler, 2012; Schmidt, Rakoczy, et al., 2016). The child and the two hand 
puppets had the opportunity to agree on how many resources from an initial 
endowment their group would like to share with unknown individuals. Later, one 
player deviated from the agreement (i.e., intended to share 0% in the prosocial 
trail or 50% in the selfish trial), and we assessed if children protested against this 
party. Based on previous investigations on moral group norms at preschool age, 
we expected 5-year-old children to protest more against the protagonist violating 
a prosocial compared to a selfish agreement (Cooley & Killen, 2015).  
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2.2 Method  
 Participants  
Forty-eight 3-year-old (n = 24; 36 – 47 months; M = 3 years, 7 months; 12 girls) and 
5-year-old (n = 24; 60 – 71 months, M = 5 years, 5 months; 12 girls) preschoolers 
participated in the study. Children were of mixed socio-economic backgrounds 
from a large German city. They were recruited via urban daycare centers (in which 
testing took place as well). Every experiment was videotaped. Parents provided 
written informed consent. Six additional children were excluded from the final 
sample due to technical error (2), experimenter error (2), uncooperativeness (1), 
or withdrawal of informed consent by parents (1).  
 Design  
After a warm-up session, the children received four trials of the target task, the 
order of which was systematically varied. Conditions (selfish versus prosocial 
sharing norm) as well as the protagonist’s behavior (following versus violating the 
norm) alternated between trials; half of the children of each age group received 
prosocial conditions first. The proposer puppet introduced first (prosocial versus 
selfish proposer) as well as the set of stickers used as resources were varied 
systematically. After the target tasks, all children participated in a forced choice 
posttest. The proposer introduced first (prosocial versus selfish proposer) was 
counterbalanced between children for each age group.  
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 Materials  
In the warm-up session, a ball, a hammer game, and a disk-and-peg game were 
used. There were four target tasks (prosocial norm – protagonist follows; prosocial 
norm – protagonist violates; selfish norm – protagonist follows; selfish norm – 
protagonist violates). Two human-like hand puppets (named “Max” and “Emil”) 
were used as proposer puppets; a third human-like hand puppet was used as 
protagonist puppet (named “Hans”). The child, the respective proposing puppet 
and the protagonist puppet were handed a wooden game board equipped with a 
green and a yellow box and a device for fixing a photograph of the receiving child. 
We used a gender matched set of photos to portray the recipients in each trial of 
the GDG and in the posttest.  
 Procedure  
Two experimenters conducted the study which lasted roughly 20 minutes. E1 
coordinated the game and operated the proposer puppets while E2 operated the 
protagonist puppet. Throughout the GDG, the child, E1, and E2 sat at a table. E1 
sat to the child’s right, and E2 took seat to the child’s left. In the posttest, E2 
coordinated the sequence and sat opposite the child (this way, the child faced the 
two proposer puppets which were put on stands in front of E2).   
 Warm-up Phase  
In the warm-up session, the child and the three hand puppets (1 prosocial and 1 
selfish proposer and the protagonist) played together with a ball. After the ball 
play, the two proposers “got tired” and went to sleep. The child, the protagonist 
puppet and E1 played a hammer game, followed by a disc-and-peg game. The 
                 Chapter 2: Study 1  
  
39 
protagonist acted clumsily (to encourage the child’s critical evaluation of his 
actions in the later intervention task).   
 Introductory Phase  
E1 presented three game boards, handed one over to the child and said: "Here is 
a board for you with a green and a yellow box. And these are four stickers. Each 
sticker you put in the green box is yours. This yellow box belongs to this child 
[pointing at the picture of the recipient] from another kindergarten. 
Unfortunately, this child did not yet receive any stickers at all, but she/he would 
like some, too. If she/he does not get any stickers, she/he will be very sad. And 
here we have two more boards, one for [name of protagonist] and one for Hans. 
It's the same for them. Hans [addressed directly by E1], the green box is for you, 
the yellow box is for the other child. And for [proposer puppet’s name] it’s the 
same. The green box is for you [addressing protagonist pupped, still placed on a 
stand], and the yellow box is for the other child.” E1 then turned towards the child 
and the hand puppets: "And you know what? You can decide together how to 
distribute the stickers. So, you're a team and decide together how each of you is 
going to do it, okay?" Then E1 took the proposer puppet off the stand and 
operated the puppet.   
 Agreement Phase  
The proposer puppet suggested how to distribute the stickers: “Aaah 
[spontaneously], I have an idea. Shall we do it like this: Every one of us puts x 
stickers in the green box for ourselves and y stickers in the yellow box for the other 
child, okay?” Hans: “Okay, we can do it like that, can’t we?” Proposer [turned to 
child] asked: “Are we going to do it like this?” After the child had answered, the 
protagonist said: “Okay, let’s do this!” The proposer summed up: "Okay, so 
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everyone puts x stickers in the green box for themselves and y stickers in the 
yellow box for the other child. And I will start." The proposer distributed the 
stickers as agreed. Thereupon the proposer puppet said: "And now it's Hans' turn. 
[To child] And you pay good attention, ok?"  
 Test Phase  
In the action phase, Hans distributed the stickers and the child’s spontaneous 
reaction to the protagonist’s action was observed. When Hans made a prosocial 
distribution (2:2) of stickers, he said: "Two for me and two for the other child". 
When he distributed selfishly (4:0), he said: "Everything for me" and put all four 
stickers in his box.   
 Action Phase  
Then it was the child's turn to distribute their stickers. The number of stickers the 
child shared with the respective recipient “from another kindergarten” (1–4) was 
assessed. Furthermore, we documented if the child followed or violated the 
agreed-upon sharing norm.  
 Posttest  
The posttest consisted of a forced-choice preference test. E2 sat opposite the 
child. The two puppets were placed on stands in front of E2, and a game board 
was installed in front of the child. E2 summed up: "Look, [proposer 1] had the idea 
to distribute the stickers this way. [E2 put two stickers in the green, two stickers 
in the yellow box of the game board]. And [proposer 2] had the idea to distribute 
stickers that way [E2 placed four stickers in the green box and no stickers in the 
yellow box]. Who do you think is the good one?” After the child’s response, E2 
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asked the child to justify her decision by asking: “And why?” (for schematic 
representation of the whole experiment, see Figure 1).  
  
Figure 1. Schematic representation of Study 1.   
Note. The procedure consisted of four within-participant conditions: two trials of 
a selfish and two trials of a prosocial sharing norm. The protagonist either followed 
(in 50% of the trials) or violated (in 50% of the trials) the norm. In each trial, 
children distributed stickers themselves in the action phase. The procedure was 
closed by a forced-choice posttest.   
 Coding and Dependent Measures   
All sessions were recorded, transcribed, and coded from videotape by a single 
observer. A second independent observer, blind to the hypotheses and conditions 
of the study, transcribed and coded a random sample of 25% of all sessions for 
reliability.  
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 Agreement Phase  
Children’s agreement with the prosocial versus selfish proposals was coded in a 
binary system (0 = agreement, 1 = disagreement). Interrater reliability was good:  
Cohen’s κ = .84.  
 Test Phase  
The children’s verbal and behavioral interventions were classified into one of four 
(hierarchically ordered) categories:   
(i) Normative protest, that is, protest, critique, and tattling (towards E1), making 
use of normative vocabulary (e.g., “That’s wrong”, “You have to give two 
stickers to the child!”, “He did it wrong”)  
(ii) Imperative-implicit protest, that is, verbal and/or behavioral protest without 
normative vocabulary (e.g., “Give it to him!”, changing position of 
protagonist’s stickers)  
(iii) Indirect forms of protest (e.g., saying “There is one sticker missing in this box”, 
“No!” or “Uh-uh!”, head-shaking, pointing at the target box) and hints of 
protest (i.e., behavior suggestive of protest, but not explicit enough; e.g., 
pointing gestures, saying “No!” or “Uhuh!”)  
(iv) Irrelevant (i.e., no or irrelevant utterances and behaviors)  
 Interrater reliability was good: Cohen’s κ = .84. 
 Action Phase  
The number of stickers distributed by the children was coded. Interrater reliability 
was very good: Cohen’s κ = 1.   
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 Posttest  
Children’s answers to the forced-choice test (dichotomous variable: correct or 
incorrect response to the question of E1) were coded. Interrater reliability was 
very good: Cohen’s κ = 1. Additionally, children were asked to justify their decision 
(“why [is he the good one]?”). Children’s responses were considered as normative-
moral reasoning (e.g., “Because he did it correctly”, “Because he acted fairly”, 
“Because the other child will be glad if she/he gets stickers, too”), informative 
reasoning (e.g., “Because he gave two to himself and two to the other child”), and 
irrelevant responses (e.g., “Because he is the bigger one”). Interrater reliability 
was very good: Cohen’s κ = 1.  
 Statistical Analysis   
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.5.2 (The R Core Team, 2018). To 
account for the non-independence of the data (i.e., repeated observations per 
child), generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with binomial error structure 
were used for comparing children’s performance in the two conditions in the 
agreement phase and the test phase (Baayen, 2008; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2013). Unstandardized parameter estimates (b), standard errors, 95% 
confidence intervals (CIs), and odds ratios (ORs) were obtained from the full 
model. Models included trial and condition as fixed factors and participant as a 
random effect. Effects of interest were tested by comparing the fit of the full 
model (including all fixed and random effects) with the fit of a reduced model 
(without the predictor to be tested) using a likelihood ratio test (Dobson, 2002). 
There was no significant effect of trial.   
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2.3 Results  
 Agreement Phase  
In the agreement phase, children’s disagreement with prosocial or selfish 
proposals about how to distribute the stickers were analyzed (descriptive data is 
presented in Table 1). A Binomial GLMM revealed a significant effect of age, χ²(1) 
= 11.3, p < .001, b = 1.07, SE = 0.36, CI [0.44, 1.9], OR = 2.91. A planned comparison 
showed that 5-year-old (χ²(1) = 7.6, p < .01, b = 1.62, SE = 0.65, CI [0.44, 3.05], OR 
= 5.1), but not 3-year-old children (χ²(1) = 0.36, p < .55, b = 0.73, SE = 1.26, CI [1.91, 
3.84], OR = 2.08) disagreed significantly more with selfish proposals then with 
prosocial proposals.  
 
Table 1   
Disagreement with Suggestions of the Proposer Puppet in the Prosocial and Selfish 
Trials per Age Group   
    Prosocial trials Selfish trials  
Age group   3-year-olds  1 (2%) 2 (4%)  
 5-year-olds  4 (8%) 14 (29%)  
  
 Test Phase  
The main research question of Study 1 aimed at the investigation of whether 
preschoolers enforced novel prosocial and selfish sharing norms in a GDG. Results 
show that 5-year-old children (McNemar’s test, p < .01) but not 3-year-old 
(McNemar’s test, p = .248) protested against prosocial but not selfish norm 
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violations at significant level.  Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of children 
protesting the prosocial versus selfish norm violation for both age groups.   
 
 
Figure 2. Children's protest behavior in the prosocial and selfish condition, split per 
age groups. The protagonist either followed or violated the prosocial or selfish 
agreement.   
The asterisks indicate significance level p < .01. 
Note. PP = Protagonist Puppet. 
 
 Children’s protest behavior against the deviating puppet in the prosocial 
and selfish trials was categorized. Fisher exact tests revealed no differences in 
protest categories for 5- and 3-year-old children (see Table 2).  
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Table 2   
Number of Trials in Which Children Protest – Per Age Group and Condition  
  Protest category 
Fisher 
exact text 
Age group Condition 
Moral-
normative 
Imperative Indirect p 
3-year-olds Prosocial 2 1 0 .2       
 Selfish 0 0 3  
5-year-olds Prosocial 5 4 1 .327 
 Selfish 5 0 1  
 Action Phase  
In the action phase, children’s sharing decisions per condition and age group were 
analyzed. Table 3 illustrates the percentage of shared stickers by the children, per 
age group and norm adherence of the target puppet (who either followed or 
violated the agreed-upon prosocial versus selfish sharing norm).  
 
Table 3 
Percentage of Stickers Shared by Children in Prosocial and Selfish Condition  
Note. Varying norm adherence of target puppet: Target puppet follows prosocial 
norm (i.e. sharing 50%) or violates prosocial norm (i.e. keeping 100% instead of 
sharing 50%). Target puppet follows selfish norm (i.e. keeping 100%) or violates 
selfish norm (i.e. sharing 50% instead of keeping 100% of the stickers). 
 Shared stickers Norm 
adherence of 
target puppet Age group Prosocial Selfish 
3-year-olds 50 % 21% Following 
 48% 35% Violating 
5-year-olds 49% 11% Following 
 40% 25% Violating 
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 Posttest  
The posttest consisted of a forced choice task and a reasoning phase. The 
experimenter simultaneously presented the prosocial and the selfish proposer 
puppets and asked children who was the good one. A planned exact binomial test 
(two-tailed) revealed that 5-year-old (92%, p < .001) but not 3-year-old children 
(50% younger children, p = .581) reliably identified the prosocial proposer as the 
good one. In the reasoning phase, participants provided justifications for their 
decision which were coded as normative-moral reasoning or informative 
reasoning processes. Justifications of those children who had not answered the 
posttest (“who is the good one?”) correctly (n = 10) were excluded. Four additional 
children were excluded from the analysis because of experimenter error during 
the reasoning phase of the posttest. Therefore, the following analysis is based on 
22 five-year-olds and 12 three-year-old children. Data reveals a significant 
correlation of age and verbal reasoning in the posttest (χ²(2) = 7.26, p = .027, φ = 
0.26). Normative and moral reasoning increased with age (see descriptive 
statistics in Table 4). For the group of 3-year-old children these results should be 
considered with caution as the analysis refers only to 12/24 children in this age 
group.  
 
Table 4  
Children’s Responses in the Reasoning Phase of the Posttest  
Age group Verbal reasoning   
 
n 
 None Informing Moral/ 
Normative 
 
3-year-olds 9 (75%) 3 (25%) 0 (0%)  12  
5-year-olds 1 (5%) 8 (36%) 13 (59%)  22  
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2.4 Discussion  
The current study assessed if preschoolers stipulate and enforce prosocial sharing 
norms in a GDG. Therefore, one child and two hand puppets had the opportunity 
to agree on how to distribute resources between themselves and a group of 
passive recipients. Children’s agreement to (costly) prosocial and (advantageous) 
selfish sharing norms was assessed. The prosocial norm consisted of an equitable 
distribution of stickers between the players and recipients; the selfish agreement 
included no sharing with passive recipients. The protagonist puppet either 
followed or violated the respective agreement: The violation of the respective 
agreement means that the target puppet shared more resources than agreed-
upon in the selfish condition (50:50 instead of 100:0), or fewer resources than 
agreed-upon in the prosocial condition (100:0 instead of 50:50). We found 5- but 
not 3-year-old children enforced prosocial, but not selfish, sharing norms, by 
protesting against a group member who violated the prosocial norm. The protest 
against (or sanction of) norm-violation stems from someone’s commitment to 
group norms (M. J. Rossano, 2012; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). Therefore, the 
fact that the older participants in the study enforced prosocial norms allows the 
conclusion that they considered the prosocial agreement to be normatively 
binding (while the selfish agreement did not gain normative weight). With other 
words, children had normative expectations about others’ prosocial actions based 
on the agreed-upon prosocial sharing norm (but they did not have selfish 
expectations based on the selfish agreement) and expected that one “ought” to 
distribute resources fairly after agreeing on the prosocial sharing norm. 
 Furthermore, children at 5 years of age expressed more disagreement with 
the proposals of the selfish, then of the prosocial puppet in the norm setting 
phase. This means that children were willing to agree on the (costly) prosocial 
norm, but they expressed concern about agreeing to the selfish norm. Another 
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important finding of this study refers to children’s sharing decisions: Children in 
both age groups shared half of their endowment with the recipient child, after 
agreeing to a prosocial sharing norm. This sharing behavior was not affected by 
the behavior of the target puppet following (e.g. shared half of the stickers 
himself) or violating (e.g. shared none of his stickers) the agreement. If the group 
had agreed on a selfish sharing norm, 5-year-olds children averagely shared 11% 
of their stickers and 3-year-olds shared averagely 21% of their stickers with the 
recipient child if the other group members acted selfishly. If the target puppet 
violated the selfish agreement (i.e., shared more resources than agreed upon), 3- 
and 5-year-olds shared significantly more stickers themselves. This means that the 
children’s sharing behavior was affected by an agent who behaved prosocially 
despite an egoistic agreement. However, the prosocial sharing decisions of the 
children were hardly influenced by the behavior of a group member who behaved 
selfishly despite a prosocial agreement. With regard to the younger age group, this 
result was surprising, as children from 3 years of age are known to understand 
several principles of fairness, while this knowledge is not necessarily consistent 
with their behavior (Blake et al., 2014). Since it is known that young children are 
more likely to copy an action performed by others (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 
2012) it is also surprising that 3-year-old children shared on average 21% of their 
endowment (which is about one out of four stickers) even if both hand puppets 
did not share anything at all (in the selfish-following trials). 
 The posttest of this study assessed if 3- and 5-year old children identified 
the prosocial or the selfish proposer as the good one. It was found that the older, 
but not the younger age group reliably identified the prosocial proposer as the 
good one. The children justified their decisions predominantly on the basis of 
normative-moral reasons, such as that the prosocial proposer had done the "right” 
or “fair” proposals. Children’s consideration of normative and moral reasons in 
their evaluations nicely fits with and complements previous findings on the 
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development of intent-based normative judgments. During the preschool years, 
children begin to show sensitivity to the intentionality of an agent’s action (Proft 
& Rakoczy, 2018; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Proft and Rakoczy 
(2018) showed that children from 5 years onwards were more sensitive towards 
the mental state information for moral- compared to conventional transgressions. 
Although the posttest did not assess norm transgressions – but reasoning about 
why someone is a good person, 5-year old children in our study refer to normative 
and moral reasons in this morally relevant context. In the current task, the moral 
relevance of a prosocial sharing decision was underpinned by the wording of the 
experimenter. In the introductory phase, she stressed that the recipients would 
like to have stickers and would be sad if they did not get any. Eventually this might 
also be a reason for the overall high sharing rates in the GDG. This explanation 
resembles a finding by Engelmann and colleagues (2016) who conducted an 
experiment in which children had to decide whether to adhere to peer behavior - 
while the behavior of the peers was more or less prosocial. Children at 5 years of 
age were found to behave prosocially in a group context in case of a recipient in 
need, even when there was a strong selfish incentive not to. If the need of a 
recipient was reduced, children adapted to the asocial group.   
 Taken together, moral norms in the current study gained their normative 
force not only by agreement or expectations of conformity, but also by 
considerations of the content (i.e., being prosocial versus selfish) of the proposed 
norm. This is especially interesting when compared with findings of Schmidt et al. 
(Schmidt, Rakoczy, et al., 2016), who found that unanimity was the key factor for 
establishing novel conventional norms. The findings of the current study are 
limited to the special context of this GDG, and therefore require further 
investigations. For example, it would be helpful to contrast the findings of this 
study to a version of the GDG with covered resource allocation. The fact that 
children shared in public might have supported their prosocial motivation as it is 
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known that concerns about group reputation can increase prosociality in young 
children (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2018). However, the prediction of 
reputational theory on prosociality (“higher levels of prosociality in the presence 
of others”) does not hold until 5 years of age (Engelmann & Rapp, 2018; Hepach, 
Haberl, Lambert, & Tomasello, 2017). Thus, while older children in this study were 
eventually concerned about reputation (based on the public donation of resources 
for the individual player as well as for the group as a whole), this might not be valid 
for 3-year-olds.  
 These results of the current study add important knowledge to the 
literature on children’s understanding of how norms can come into existence and 
suggest that – when moral issues are at stake – novel norms gain their force not 
only through agreement or expectations of conformity, but also through 
considerations of the content of the proposed norm. Within the current 
experiment, normative expectations about others’ prosocial behavior – as an 
important building block of moral autonomy – were assessed. Although the 
respective prosocial behavior came along with personal costs (i.e., fair distribution 
of resources means less stickers for the distributor in the GDG), children obeyed 
more to the internalized prosocial sharing norm than to desire for valued 
resources. 
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Abstract  
While children learn much about themselves through their own actions, they are 
also competent social and cultural learners; in particular, they do not just learn 
how other individuals prefer to do things, but rather how “we” – as a cultural 
group – do things, even after minimal exposure to an agent’s single intentional 
action. We investigated whether the mere observation of an agent, who 
intentionally engages in costly sharing, would increase children’s own prosocial 
behavior.   
 In two experiments, preschoolers observed an agent who shared an item 
with a recipient in need. Experiment 1 consisted of three between-subject 
conditions: The actor either made an (a) intentional costly choice (i.e., sharing 
instead of keeping the item), (b) a non-costly choice (i.e., sharing instead of 
watching the item be thrown away), or (c) had no choice (i.e., was coerced to share 
by authority). Then, children were given the opportunity to decide how many 
stickers (out of three) they themselves would like to share with a recipient in need. 
Children showed more other-prioritizing sharing behavior when they had 
observed the actor making a costly choice than in the other two conditions. In 
Experiment 2 the design was reduced to the conditions (a) and (c), and two test 
trials were run per child. Two age groups were assessed separately: a younger age 
group of 4-year-old children and an older age group of 5-year old children. The 
results of Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 1 for the group of 5- 
not for the group of 4-year-old children. In sum, these findings may help shed light 
on important mechanisms of children’s prosocial decisions and their prosocial 
motivation more generally.   
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3.1 Introduction   
 Determinants of Prosociality  
Prosocial behavior is a fundamental part of human coexistence which develops 
early in life. From 2 to 3 years of age, children help others complete their goals 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), sympathize with those who are harmed (Vaish et 
al., 2009) or in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992), 
share their toys (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Svetlova et al., 2010), and show a 
preference for prosocial others (Burns & Sommerville, 2014; Hamlin & Wynn, 
2011). High-cost sharing behaviors have longitudinal consistency (Eisenberg et al., 
2002), and prosocial actions are associated with cognitive development like 
mature moral judgment and affective perspective taking (Eisenberg & Shell, 1986; 
Vaish et al., 2009). Research suggests even earliest acts of helping behavior to be 
intrinsically motivated and that socialization practices involving extrinsic rewards 
can undermine this tendency (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). Ulber and 
colleagues (2016) found a similar effect on preschoolers’ sharing behavior: After 
being rewarded for their prosocial costly sharing, children shared less when they 
did not receive rewards anymore opposed to when they had received no rewards 
at all. A possible explanation is self-determination theory which says that freedom 
of choice affects intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985).   
 In order to investigate the effects of choice on preschoolers’ prosocial 
decisions, Chernyak and Kushnir (2013) compared three between-subject 
conditions: In the costly choice condition, children could decide if they wanted to 
share an item with a sad animal puppet or keep the item for themselves. In the 
non-costly choice condition, children could decide between donating the item to 
the sad recipient or throwing it into the trash. In the no choice condition, they were 
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instructed to give the item to a sad animal puppet. In the subsequent test trial, 
children’s sharing decisions revealed that choice led to increased sharing behavior. 
The authors attributed their results to the prosocial-construal hypothesis which 
indicates that children rationally infer their prosociality through the process of 
making difficult, autonomous choices (Cialdini, Eisenberg, Shell, & McCreath, 
1987). It was also assessed in how far freedom of choice affects prosocial helping 
of 3- and 5-year-olds (Rapp et al., 2017). Children either participated in a choice 
condition (in which they could decide whether to help or not) or a no choice 
condition (in which they were instructed to help).  
 Prosocial motivation was subsequently assessed by the extent to which 
children helped an absent peer in the face of an attractive alternative game. Five-
year-olds who had experienced choice helped more than children who had no 
choice, whereas the results of 3-year-olds did not differentiate between 
conditions. Another study shows that preschool children consider freedom of 
choice when they evaluate their own moral behavior (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2014) 
or the immoral behavior of others (Josephs et al., 2016). Taken together, these 
studies outline the crucial factor of choice on preschoolers’ prosocial action. So 
far, studies predominantly addressed first-person experience of prosocial 
motivation and moral learning. However, humans also interact and learn on the 
impersonal level, for example, they align with others through social norms and 
other cultural activities. For this reason, a third-person experience of prosociality 
and moral learning was investigated in the second study, which is to be presented 
and discussed in the section 3.1.2.  
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 Intentionality and Cultural Learning  
While children learn much about themselves through their own actions, they are 
also competent social and cultural learners (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 
2005). Tomasello and colleagues (1993) describe cultural learning as learning 
based on interaction and communication with other people, especially with other 
members of the cultural group (not only on direct encounter with the natural 
world). In particular, children do not just learn how other individuals prefer to do 
things, but how “things are done” in the cultural group (Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012). Through interactions with others, children infer social norms for example 
by observing others’ actions (Schmidt et al., 2011). Previous research has indicated 
that young children even have a promiscuous tendency to infer norms based on 
minimal evidence such as cues of intentionality (M. J. Rossano, 2012; Schmidt, 
Butler, et al., 2016). Younger children, in particular, differentiate between models 
using pedagogical or intentional cues versus models who accidently perform an 
action (Butler & Markman, 2012). 
 In a study of Schmidt and colleagues (2016), children spontaneously 
inferred a social norm without verbal or behavioral hints of the adult model. 
Participants enforced this self-inferred norm in case of violation through a third 
party. What is not known so far is if children’s prosocial motivation and moral 
learning are confined to first-person experience of intentional prosocial action 
(Chernyak & Kushnir, 2014), or if the process is much more complex and includes 
a child who actively draws inferences from the observation of intentional prosocial 
agents.   
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 Current Study   
Due to mechanisms of cultural learning and shared intentionality, effects of 
children’s tendency to promiscuously infer social (conventional) norms (Schmidt, 
Butler, et al., 2016) might also be found in a morally relevant context. Therefore, 
the results of Chernyak and Kushnir (2014) provide one part of knowledge of a 
presumably bigger picture: We argue that choice and intentional prosocial action 
do not only lead to increased prosocial behavior in situations involving first-person 
experience (i.e., experiencing choice and intentional prosocial action yourself), but 
also in third-person experience (i.e., observing a model making an intentional 
prosocial decision) due to mechanisms of cultural learning and collective 
intentionality. We hypothesized that children’s prosocial sharing decisions should 
not only be relatively higher when having the first-person experience of being 
prosocial (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013; Rapp et al., 2017), but also when having 
third-person experience of observing someone who is intentionally engaged in 
prosocial sharing (i.e., making a costly choice) versus observing someone who is 
coerced to act prosocially (i.e., an agent that has no choice). If a person acted 
prosocially at no personal cost (i.e., non-costly sharing) there were two possible 
options. Either the children would experience the agent as someone who did the 
“relatively” right thing by giving a valuable resource to a recipient in need instead 
of throwing it into the trash. Or children would not infer any generalizability 
because the action was more or less arbitrary from the donator’s perspective due 
to the fact that it did not contain a personal cost.   
 Experiment 1 consisted of three between-participant conditions, (a) costly 
choice, (b) non-costly choice and (c) no choice. In Experiment 2, the design was 
repeated but reduced to conditions (a) and (c); two test trials were run per child, 
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and two age groups (4- and 5-year-olds) were assessed. Minor inaccuracies in the 
wording of Experiment 1 were adapted in Experiment 2.  
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3.2 Experiment 1  
 Method  
 Participants  
Eighty-four (48 – 71 months; M = 5 years, 0 month; 42 girls) preschoolers 
participated in the study. Children came from mixed socio-economic backgrounds 
from a large German city and were recruited via urban daycare centers (in which 
testing took place). Parents provided written informed consent. Three additional 
children were tested but excluded from the final sample due to procedural error 
(1), language deficit (1) and uncooperativeness (1).  
 Design  
After a warm-up session, children observed a model phase and performed one 
trial of a sharing task. Children were randomly assigned to one of three between-
subject conditions: costly choice, non-costly choice or no choice.   
 Materials  
Stuffed animal puppets were used as recipients (a dog named “Doggie” [German: 
“Hundi”] in the model phase, and a sheep called “Ellie” in the test phase). The 
locations of the distributor’s and the recipient’s boxes (wooden boxes, 11.5 x 8 x 
6.5 cm) were systematically varied. Two types of animal stickers (frog and giraffe, 
counterbalanced) were used as resources.  
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 Procedure  
Two experimenters conducted the study which lasted roughly 10 minutes: E1, the 
coordinator, and E2 who acted as herself. The child, E1, and E2 sat at a table. E1 
sat to the child’s left and E2 opposite the child. The warm-up session consisted of 
playing with a ball, a hammer game and a disk-and-peg game.   
 Model Phase  
In the model phase, E1 put the dog on the table and said [addressing the child and 
E2]: “Look what I’ve got here. This is Doggie [petting the dog]. Doggie is feeling 
very sad today. And this is Doggie’s box” [E1 put the box with the dog’s picture 
inside of the lid on the table].   
 Manipulation Phase  
During the manipulation phase, E1 slowly pulled out a sticker and said:  
(i) Costly choice. “[Name of E2], you can keep this sticker for yourself, or you can 
give it to Doggie so that he’s feeling better”. E2 took the sticker and said 
[neutrally]: “I could keep the sticker for myself…. But I’ll give it to Doggie so 
that he’s feeling better.”  
(ii) Non-costly choice. “[Name of E2], I can throw this sticker in the trash now, or 
you can give it to Doggie so that he’s feeling better”. E2 took the sticker and 
said [neutrally]: “Instead of letting [name of E1] throw the sticker in the trash, 
I’ll give it to Doggie so that he’s feeling better.”  
(iii) No choice. “[Name of E2], I’m going to tell you now whether you can keep this 
sticker for yourself or if you have to put it into Doggie’s box so that he’s feeling 
better. You have to put it into Doggie’s box, so that he’s feeling better.” E2 
took the sticker and said [neutrally]: “I have to give it to Doggie so that he’s 
feeling better.”   
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 After the respective sentence, E2 put the sticker into Doggie’s box. E1 
closed the lid and cleared the box away.  
 Test Phase  
The test phase consisted of one trial which started by E1 addressing the child: 
“Look who else I’ve got here [presenting the sheep]. This is Ellie. Ellie is also feeling 
really sad today.” E1 and E2 petted the animal puppet, then E1 put Ellie away. A 
box with a picture of Ellie in the lid was presented, accompanied by E1 saying: 
“And this is Ellie’s box. And I’ve got another box here – this one is for you,” 
[presenting a plain box]. The boxes were positioned in front of the child, about 10 
cm apart from each other. Three stickers were placed in a row between the two 
boxes. “Here are three stickers. They’re for you! But Ellie also likes these stickers 
very much. You can keep all these stickers, then they will be put into this box [plain 
box] or you can share some with Ellie, then they will be put into Ellie’s box.” While 
the child was distributing the resources, E1 and E2 were constantly preventing eye 
contact with the child by gazing at the edge of the table in front of them.  
 Coding and Reliability  
All sessions were recorded, transcribed, and coded from videotape by a single 
observer. A second independent observer, blind to the hypotheses and conditions 
of the study, transcribed and coded a random sample of 20% of all sessions for 
reliability. Children’s sharing decisions were coded as dichotomous variables:   
(i) Self-prioritizing behavior (i.e., children kept the predominant number of 
stickers for themselves and gave the minor number to Ellie, e.g., child 2:1 Ellie)  
(ii) Other-prioritizing behavior (i.e., children kept the minor number of stickers for 
themselves and gave the predominant amount to Ellie, e.g., child 0:3 Ellie). 
 Interrater reliability was very good: Cohen’s κ = 0.89.  
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 Data Analysis  
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.5.2 (The R Core Team, 2018). Children’s 
sharing patterns were analyzed by a Chi2 Test, the effect size Cramer’s V was 
computed.  
 Results   
The analysis of children’s sharing decisions exposed a main effect of condition 
(χ2(2) = 7.71, p = .021, see Figure 3). Planned comparisons revealed that children 
shared significantly more stickers in the costly choice condition than in the non-
costly choice condition (χ2(1) = 5.85, p = .016) or in the no choice condition (χ2(1) 
= 5.85, p = .016). This seems to represent the fact that, based on the odds ratio, 
the odds of other-prioritizing sharing decisions were 2.66 (0.73, 0.898) times 
higher in the costly choice condition compared to the no choice condition, and 
they were 2.66 (0.73, 0.898) times higher in the costly choice than in the no choice  
condition.  
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Figure 3. Proportion of children making other-prioritizing sharing decisions in the 
first experiment of Study Set 2.  
The asterisks indicate significances at p < .05.  
  
 Discussion of Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 investigated if observed choice increases the prosocial sharing 
behavior of 4- to 5-year-old children. The study design was based on a study of 
Chernyak and Kushnir (2013) who found that the experience of choice increased 
the sharing decisions of 3- and 4-year-old children. In the current experiment, 
children showed a more other-prioritizing sharing behavior after observing an 
adult model intentionally acting prosocially at personal cost. These results suggest 
that children’s prosocial sharing may not only increase when having first-person 
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experience of being prosocial (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013), but also infer the 
morally “right” action from the mere observation of a knowledgeable member of 
the society in a comparable situation. The participants in the current study were 
older than the participants in the Chernyak and Kushnir study, due to the more 
complex structure of the experiment. However, Experiment 1 did not control for 
possible age effects, which required further investigation. The wording of 
condition (a) and (c) in the experiment of Chernyak and Kushnir (2013) contained 
potentially distracting differences which were adopted in Experiment 1. Thus, to 
assess the question of possible age effects and to adjust the wording of condition 
(a) and (c), a second experiment was conducted. Experiment 2 compares the age 
groups of 4 and 5-year-old children. The experiment was reduced to the main 
conditions (a) and (c) a second test trial was added to investigate the stability of 
the effects during two trials.  
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3.3 Experiment 2  
The objective of the second experiment was to disentangle possible age effects of 
Experiment 1, to adjust the wording of condition (a) and (c) and to investigate the 
stability of effects within two trials. To this end, the design of Experiment 1 was 
repeated but reduced to the conditions (a) costly choice and (c) no choice. 
Condition (b) non-costly choice was excluded as it was considered to not provide 
any relevant additional information. Furthermore, limitations concerning the 
wording in the model phase of Experiment 1 were adjusted. The following changes 
were implemented: The phrases “you can give this sticker to Doggie” (a), and “you 
have to put it in the box for Doggie” (c) were consistently transformed to “you 
can/have to give this sticker to Doggie” to ensure that wording in the two 
conditions was as similar as possible. Furthermore, the wording of the 
experimenter in condition (a) was adapted to highlight the personal cost: “Hmm, I 
could keep it for myself…. But I’ll give it to Doggie so that he feels better” was 
changed to “Hmm, I like the sticker and could keep it for myself…. But I’ll give it to 
Doggie so that he feels better”. The purpose of this change was to make clear that 
E2 did not give up the resource because it was not valuable to them but because 
of intrinsically prosocial reasons.   
 In addition, a second test trial was added to examine the stability of the 
effects within two trials. In the first trial participants were introduced to a stuffed 
sheep (“Ellie”, similar to Experiment 1). In the second trial, children were 
introduced to a stuffed penguin (“Hugo”). The procedure and wording of the 
sharing task in Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 1. To investigate 
possible age-related changes, two age groups (4 and 5-year olds) were tested per 
condition.    
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 Method  
 Participants  
Ninety-six children (n = 48 four-year-olds, 48 – 59 months, M = 4 years, 4 months; 
25 girls; and n = 48 five-year olds, 60 – 71 months, M = 5 years, 4 months; 25 girls) 
participated in the study. They came from mixed socio-economic backgrounds 
from a large German city and were recruited via urban daycare centers and a 
children’s museum (in which testing took place as well). Eight additional children 
were tested but excluded from the final sample due to experimenter error (6) or 
uncooperativeness (2).  
 Materials  
In the test phase, additional to the materials of Experiment 1, a stuffed penguin 
puppet (“Hugo”) was used. In the model and sharing tasks we used two types of 
animal stickers (frog and lion, counterbalanced).  
 Design  
After a warm-up session, children received one trial of a model phase and two 
trials of sharing tasks in which children could decide how many out of three 
stickers they wanted to share with sheep Ellie and, in the second test trials, with 
penguin Hugo. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-
subject conditions: (a) costly choice or (c) no choice (for schematic representation 
of Experiment 1 and 2, see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Schematic representation of Study Set 2.  
  
 Coding and Reliability  
All sessions were recorded, transcribed, and coded from videotape by a single 
observer. A second independent observer, blind to the hypotheses and conditions 
of the study, transcribed and coded a random sample of 20% of all sessions for 
reliability. Children’s sharing behavior in the test phase was coded and categorized 
as:   
(i) Self-prioritizing behavior (i.e., children kept the predominant number of 
stickers for themselves and gave less to Ellie [Trial 1] or Hugo [Trial 2], e.g., 
child 2:1 Ellie)  
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(ii) Other-prioritizing behavior (i.e., children kept the minor number of stickers for 
themselves and gave the predominant amount to Ellie [Trial 1] or Hugo [Trial2], 
e.g., child 0:3 Ellie)  
(iii) Prioritizing in total (i.e., the rate of other-prioritizing behavior across both trials 
was coded [0–2], e.g., [Trial 1] child 0:3 Ellie, [Trial 2] child 1:2 Hugo, leads to 
the sum score of 2).  
 Interrater reliability was very good: Cohen’s κ = 1 (total number of shared 
stickers); Cohen’s κ = 1 (self- versus other-prioritizing behavior); Cohen’s κ = 1 
(prioritizing in total).  
 Statistical Analysis  
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.5.2 (The R Core Team, 2018). To 
account for the non-independence of the data (i.e., repeated observations per 
child), we used Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) with binomial error 
structure was used to compare children’s performance in the two conditions 
(costly choice and no choice) for each age group (Baayen, 2008; Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2013). Unstandardized parameter estimates (b), standard 
errors, 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and odds ratios (ORs) were obtained from 
the full model. Models included condition, gender and trial as fixed effects and 
participant as a random effect. We tested for the effect of condition by comparing 
the fit of the full model (including all fixed and random effects) with the fit of a 
reduced model (without condition) using a likelihood ratio test (Dobson, 2002).  
There were no significant effects of gender and trial.   
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 Results  
A binomial GLMM with revealed that there was no interaction effect of condition 
and age χ2(1) = 0.44, p = .51, b = -0.32, SE = 0.00, CI [-2.4, 1.16], OR = 0.32. A second 
binomial GLMM revealed a main effect of age (χ2(1) = 10.56, p = .001, b = 2.72, SE 
= 1.06, CI [1.03, 5.55], OR = 15.24) on children's other prioritizing sharing decisions. 
Planned comparisons revealed that 5-year-old children (χ2(1) = 4.76, p = .029, b = 
1.33, SE = 0.63, CI [0.33, 3.09], OR = 3.78), but not 4-year-old children (χ2(1) = 1.74, 
p = .187, b = 0.77, SE = 0.64, CI [– 0.39, 2.89], OR = 2.76) showed more other-
prioritizing sharing decisions in the costly choice than in the no choice condition. 
Figure 5 illustrates other-prioritizing sharing decisions per trial and age group.  
 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of other-prioritizing trials per age group.   
The asterisk indicates significance level of p < .05.  
* 
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 Discussion of Experiment 2  
The aim of Experiment 2 was to assess age related changes in children’s prosocial 
sharing decisions after observing an adult model sharing at personal cost in a costly 
choice or no choice condition. The wording of conditions (a) and (c) was adjusted 
to ensure to the fullest possible comparability between the conditions. 
Furthermore, a second test trial was added. The results of Experiment 2 revealed 
no interaction effect of age and condition which means that the results for the 
younger and older age groups tend towards the same direction. There was an 
effect of age for children’s other-prioritizing sharing decisions: 5-year-old children 
showed overall more other-prioritizing sharing decisions than 4-year-olds. 
Planned comparisons exposed that 5-year-olds showed more other-prioritizing 
sharing decisions in the costly choice condition than in the no choice condition. 
This effect was not found for 4-year-old children. These findings indicate that the 
effect of observed choice on preschoolers’ prosocial sharing decisions develops 
with age.  
3.4 General Discussion of Study Set 2  
Past research has shown that preschoolers tend to be more prosocial after having 
voluntarily shared a resource at a personal cost with another individual than after 
having shared at no personal cost or after having been instructed to share 
(Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013). While children learn much about themselves via their 
own actions, they are also competent social and cultural learners (Tomasello, 
1999); in particular, they do not just learn how other individuals prefer to do 
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things, but rather how “we” – as a cultural group – do things (Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012), even after minimal exposure to an agent’s single intentional action 
(Schmidt et al., 2016). Therefore, the current study set investigated whether the 
mere observation of an agent who voluntarily decides to engage in costly sharing 
would increase children’s own prosocial behavior. It was examined whether the 
process of moral learning and prosocial motivation of preschool aged children 
involves not only first-person experience, but also an active child who draws 
conclusions from the observation of an intentional prosocial agent.   
 The results of Experiment 1 revealed that observed choice increased 
preschoolers’ prosocial sharing behavior. The participants in the costly choice 
condition shared more prosaically themselves then participants in the other two 
conditions. The sharing rates in the non-costly choice condition were identical to 
those in the no choice condition. This suggests that the participants in condition 
(b) could not derive any prosocial intentionality from the non-costly decision of 
the adult model, since it remained unclear how the model would have acted in the 
case of personal costs. These results add important knowledge to the research on 
how choice affects prosocial action. However, the important question of age-
related changes remained unsolved. Whereas the children in the study of 
Chernyak and Kushnir were 3 and 4 years of age, Experiment 1 assessed children 
from 4-5 years of age, due to required underlying cognitive capacities to process 
the facets of observed intentional (versus non-intentional) prosocial action. But as 
many social-cognitive competencies develop in the span of 4.0-5.11 years of age, 
Experiment 2 investigated age-related changed between the groups of 4- and 
5year old children. Furthermore, minor inaccuracies in the wording of condition 
(a) and (c) of Experiment 1 were adjusted and a second test trial was added. The 
results of Experiment 2 replicate the findings of Experiment 1 for 5- but not 4-year 
old children: A significant effect of condition was found for 5- but not 4-year old 
children. Across both conditions, 5-year old children showed more other-
prioritizing sharing behavior then 4-year old children. This finding is in line with 
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previous studies which show that prosocial behavior increases during the 
preschool years (Rochat et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2013). Eventually, the sharing 
rates between conditions did not vary for younger children because those who 
had observed the experimenter telling the adult model what to do might in 
condition (c) might have inferred that being prosocial was the “right thing” 
(Rakoczy et al., 2008).   
 Taken together, the results of Study Set 2 suggest how mechanisms of 
cultural learning and collective intentionality enable children to draw inferences 
from the mere observation of intentional prosocial agent’s action without 
pedagogical indication. The results revealed that 5-year-old children showed more 
other-prioritizing sharing behavior when they had observed an intentional agent 
sharing at personal cost compared to the other two conditions (i.e., sharing at no 
personal cost or being coerced to share). These results are supported by the study 
of Schmidt and colleagues (2011) who found that children do not passively wait 
for explicit instruction or socialization by adults but have active motivation to infer 
social norms when they observe others’ actions. Even after minimal exposure to 
an agent’s single intentional action, children learn from others and infer social 
norms. If a person was coerced to share, the participants in our study did not 
receive information about the model’s reasons, intentions, or motives for action. 
Thus, they could not generalize this behavior, and so they behaved relatively less 
prosocial in such a situation themselves. This overall effect can be particularly 
strong because children had evidence that the person who voluntarily chose 
prosociality was perceived as a competent member of their cultural group - a 
hypothesis to be investigated in future studies. For instance, future studies could 
investigate how a priming of mechanisms of cultural learning affect the prosocial 
behavior of children (e.g., the adult model might present a new game at the 
beginning of the study which is introduced as a cultural asset).  
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 In sum, these findings help to shed light on important mechanisms of 
children’s prosocial decisions as well as their moral learning and motivation more 
general.   
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Study 3: Preschoolers Expect Prosocial Actions from Others 
Who Shared Voluntarily, Not Involuntarily 
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Abstract  
To navigate through our complex social world and to detect cooperative partners, 
children must pay attention to the underlying intentions of individuals performing 
morally relevant actions. These actions and the underlying intentions provide 
information about how the person will behave in the future, which can lead to 
ambiguous situations. For instance, we might be uncertain about a person's future 
prosocial behavior if that person was not acting voluntarily but was forced to 
behave in a certain prosocial manner. Prior research has found that children 
themselves tend to be more prosocial when they had voluntarily shared a resource 
at a personal cost with another individual compared to when they were instructed 
to share. It is not known, however, to what extent choice and intentional prosocial 
behavior play a role in preschoolers’ third-party expectations about other’s 
tendency to behave prosocial or selfish. Here, we investigated preschoolers’ 
descriptive expectations about the causal agent of a prosocial and selfish action, 
based on agents’ prior history of voluntary versus involuntary moral action. Our 
findings suggest that from around 4 years of age, children differentiate in moral 
terms between an agent who shares resources voluntarily and an agent who was 
instructed to share. From 5.5 years of age, preschoolers use information about the 
circumstances and underlying intentions of agents’ prior moral actions to form 
descriptive, third-party expectations about their current prosocial versus selfish 
behavior. They expected an agent who had made an intentional decision to donate 
a resource at personal cost to be more likely to continue to act prosocially (and less 
likely to act selfishly) than an agent who was instructed to share by an authority.  
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4.1 Introduction  
 Human Cooperation and Social Norms  
Human cooperation and group life require sophisticated strategies for social 
interaction and communication. More concretely, the human species has the 
specific ability to collaborate with a large number of genetically independent 
individuals in a mutually beneficial way (Melis & Semmann, 2010). Although the 
scale of human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle, one key factor to these 
abilities lies in the evolution of human cultures, when people established moral 
systems of sanctions and rewards which led to the advantage of individuals with 
more prosocial motives, who adapted well to their social environment (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). There prosocial motives included 
preferences for reciprocity, altruism and inequality aversion. The establishment 
and enforcement of social norms (Camerer & Fehr, 2004) shaped human culture 
and stabilized coordination and cooperation within groups (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013). The participation in collaborative activities requires the ability to share 
intentions (Searle, 1995) with other individuals and groups, a phenomenon that is 
called shared intentionality (Göckeritz et al., 2014; Tomasello et al., 2005). From 14 
months of age onwards, children understand others as intentional actors and 
actively exchange experiences and emotions with them (Tomasello et al., 2005). 
Research on the ontogeny of social norms reveals that already infants have a 
certain understanding of social norms (Rakoczy et al., 2008). From 3 years of age, 
they protest against an agent’s moral transgression (F. Rossano et al., 2011; 
Schmidt et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2011) and by 5 years of age, children understand 
that social norms are binding to everyone who participates (Göckeritz et al., 2014).   
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 Moral Judgment and Behavioral Prediction  
It is an important developmental milestone for young children to realize that the 
moral judgment of an action is not only based on consequences, but also on 
underlying intentions (Fu, Xiao, Killen, & Lee, 2014; Killen & Smetana, 2015; Turiel, 
2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). Piaget (1932) postulated that children up to the 
age of 10 put more weight on the consequences of an agent's morally relevant 
actions than on their mental states, such as intentions in evaluating the moral 
virtue of an action. Recent research about moral judgments of children reveals 
ambiguous results: Whereas some studies with simplified, age-appropriate 
methods showed that children at pre-school age consider an agent’s intention in 
their moral judgments (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Bartholomew, 2016; Nobes, 
Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010) others find that 
children up to school age give more weight to results than intentions (Cushman, 
Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Zelazo et al., 1996). 
First and second order theory of mind competence plays an important role for 
children making appropriate moral judgments based on the intention of an actor in 
a social situation (Fu et al., 2014). Killen and colleagues (2011) investigated 
children’s understanding of intentions in a morally relevant theory of mind task 
(MoToM) and found that children between 3.5 and 5.5 years of age began to take 
a transgressor’s intention (i.e., accidental versus intentional transgressor) into 
account. Moreover, the competence of classical false belief tasks was related to the 
attribution of intentions. Li and Tomasello (2018) found that between the ages of 
3 and 5, children develop the ability to make judgments on intent-based indirect 
reciprocity and that 5-year-olds’ social preferences are affected by an agent’s 
previous action. Gvozdic and colleagues (2016) furthermore highlighted the critical 
role of inhibitory control in processing situations with conflicting intentions and 
outcomes (e.g., in case of accidental harm). Inhibitory control is an important ability 
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for mature intent based moral reasoning because it helps to focus on important 
information while irrelevant information is tuned.   
 Another important social cognitive ability is the attribution of traits (Liu, 
Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). Some studies found that children until 8 years of age 
are reluctant in predicting stability of human behavior (Kalish, 2002; Rholes & 
Ruble, 1984; Rotenberg, 1980). Others show that, under certain conditions, 
preschoolers from 4 years of age can use information about past behavior to make 
predictions about future behavior (Cain, Heyman, & Walker, 1997; Liu et al., 2007). 
Dozier (1991) showed that 5- and 6-year-old children, when confronted with a 
simple, quantitative predictive task, can make feature-consistent behavioral 
predictions.   
 Prosociality and Choice  
Prosocial behavior develops before the second year of life (Svetlova et al., 2010) 
and is driven by acts of helping, sharing or comforting others when in distress 
(Brownell et al., 2009; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Already infants do not behave equally prosocial 
towards all individuals but tend to prefer helping actors to hindering actors 
(Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Vaish and 
colleagues (2010) showed that preschoolers’ prosocial behavior is mediated by the 
intentions underlying an agent`s morally relevant behavior in a third party 
paradigm. Children at the age of 21 months helped other children if they had 
previously shown the intention to act prosocially towards them (Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2010). Olson and Spelke (2008) found that children at 3.5 years of age 
were more likely to distribute resources to individuals who showed direct or 
indirect reciprocal generosity themselves.  
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One important factor in young children`s expression of prosocial behavior is 
freedom of choice. A basic understanding of the concept of free choice develops to 
an explicit form at 4 years of age (Kushnir, Gopnik, Chernyak, Seiver, & Wellman, 
2015) and even infants show a fundamental understanding of the different factors 
that can constrain actions (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). Chernyak 
and Kushnir (2013) asked preschoolers to distribute stickers to a sad individual and 
compared the effects of a personal costly choice (i.e., keeping a sticker or giving it 
to sad individual), sharing without personal costs (i.e., sharing a sticker or throwing 
it in the trash) and no experience of choice (i.e., being told to share by an authority). 
Children who shared at personal costs shared more resources with a new individual 
in a subsequent sharing context than in the non-costly choice or on the no choice 
condition. The findings were discussed in the context of the prosocial construal 
hypothesis, which describes rational inferences about one’s own prosociality 
through the process of making difficult, autonomous choices. Freedom of choice 
also effects preschoolers’ evaluation of others’ actions; they were found to protest 
more when a moral transgression occurs under free conditions compared to 
restricted conditions (Josephs et al., 2016). Taken together, these findings point out 
the importance of the factor of choice in children’s own prosocial actions as well as 
in their evaluation of others. The open question is in how far information about the 
factor of choice in other’s prosocial actions effect children’s expectations about 
those agent’s future prosocial behavior.  
 Aim of the Current Study  
In conclusion, this study was interested in how children use information about an 
agent’s intention to form predictions about future morally relevant actions. With 
other words, if children form descriptive third-party expectations about the causal 
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agent of a prosocial and a selfish action, based on the agents’ prior history of 
voluntary or involuntary prosocial action.  
 The participants of the current study observed two human-like hand 
puppets who shared a resource with a sad plush dog. One of the agents made an 
intentional decision to donate a resource to the recipient (i.e., voluntary prosocial 
agent, VPA) the other agent wanted to keep the resource for herself but was 
instructed to share by an authority (i.e., involuntary prosocial agent, IPA). 
Thereafter, children were asked about the underlying intentions of both agents 
(“Did he want to or have to share the sticker?”). In the main task children saw a 
prosocial and a selfish distribution of marbles that they were asked to match to the 
respective distribution to the previously voluntary versus involuntary prosocial 
agent. In a forced choice posttest, children were asked who of both agents was the 
“good guy” and to justify their decision in a reasoning phase.  
 A group of younger (4.0 – 5.5 years) and older (5.6 – 6.11 years) 
preschoolers was assessed. It was assumed that both age groups would reliably 
identify the agent's intentions and therefore answer the control questions 
correctly. Due to the interrelation of the development of moral judgment and first 
and second order theory of mind (Cushman et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014; Killen, 
Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011) as well as inhibitory or cognitive 
control (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Gvozdic et al., 2016) it 
was assumed that older but not younger preschoolers would reliably identify the 
VPA as the initiator of the prosocial distribution of marbles and the IPA as the 
initiator of the selfish distribution of marbles. Furthermore, it was predicted that 
our participants would reliably identify the VPA as the good one in the posttest 
because research shows that children at only 3 years of age consider others’ moral 
behaviors and disadvantage agents who have harmful intentions (Olson & Spelke, 
2008; Vaish et al., 2010). Eisenberg-Berg (1979) investigated the development of 
children’s reasoning about prosocial moral dilemmas (in which the need of an 
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individual conflicted with those of others). She found that empathic considerations 
and judgments reflecting internalized values increased with age. This led to the 
expectation that older children would justify their decision by reflecting on the 
intentions and inner attitudes of the actor, while younger children would 
predominantly refer to a description of the behavior of the selected actors.  
4.2 Method 
 Participants  
Seventy-two children participated in the study: n = 36 younger children (M = 4 
years, 8 months; range = 48 – 66 months; 16 girls) and n = 36 older children (M = 6 
years, 1 month; range = 67 – 83 months; 19 girls). Children came from mixed socio-
economic backgrounds from a large German city and were recruited via a children’s 
museum and urban daycare centers (in which testing took place as well). Parents 
provided written informed consent. Five additional children were excluded from 
the final sample due to experimenter error (3) or uncooperativeness (2).  
 Design   
In a mixed design, all children participated in the model phase (two control 
questions), the test phase (two trials) and the posttest (one trial). Both tasks were 
preceded by a warm-up session (playing with a ball, a hammer game, and a disc-
and-peg game). The VPA and the IPA’s position (left versus right from the child’s 
viewpoint) were alternated within and varied between children. Furthermore, the 
puppet introduced first (left versus right) and the puppet speaking first were 
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counterbalanced across children. The order of marble distributions in the test 
phase (prosocial [1:2] versus selfish [3:0] condition) was systematically varied.  
 Materials  
Humanlike hand puppets were used as VPA and IPA (named “Max” and “Tom”). In 
the model phase, a plush dog [“Doggie”; German: “Hundi”] was presented as the 
recipient; colorful animal stickers were used as resources and a wooden box (11.5 
x 8 x 6.5 cm) with a photo of the plush dog on the lid was used to deposit the 
stickers. In the test phase, two plush animals (sheep “Ellie” and penguin “Hugo”) 
were introduced as recipients. A wooden panel was equipped with two boxes: one 
belonging to the distributor and one to the recipient. In order to identify the boxes 
of the recipients, photos of the sheep and the penguin were put into the respective 
boxes. The box for the distribution did not have a photo. Three marbles were used 
as resources in the test trials. Two stands (wooden sticks, vertically attached to a 
base) held the hand puppets during the test phase and posttest phase.  
 Procedure   
Two experimenters conducted the study, which lasted roughly 20 minutes: E1, the 
coordinator, and E2, who operated the hand puppets. The child, E1, and E2 sat at a 
table. E1 sat to the child’s left, and E2 sat opposite the child.  
 Warm-Up  
In the warm-up session, the child, E1 and E2 played together with a ball and a 
hammer game. After E1 put the hammer game away, the hand puppets appeared 
simultaneously facing the child. Both puppets introduced themselves successively 
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to the child and E1 (“Hi, my name is [Max/Tom]”). Then E1 invited the hand puppets 
to join her and the child in the disc-and-peg game, which the puppets affirmed. 
After each warm-up game, E1 said: "I'll put that away."  
 Model Phase  
E1 put a plush dog on the table and addressed the child and the two hand puppets: 
“Look who else I’ve got here. This is Doggie. Doggie is feeling very sad today. And 
this is Doggie’s box [putting the dog’s box on the table].” E1 showed a sticker to the 
hand puppets, saying: “[Name of VPA], you can keep this sticker for yourself or you 
can give it to Doggie so that he is feeling better.” The VPA responded, “I like the 
sticker and I could keep it for myself, but I want to give it to Doggie so that he is 
feeling better,” took the sticker from E1 and put it into the dog’s box. E1 asked the 
child: “Tell me, did [name of VPA] want to or did he have to give the sticker to 
Doggie?” After the child`s response, E1 turned to the second hand puppet, pulled 
out a sticker and said: “[Name of IPA], I will tell you now if you can keep this sticker 
for yourself or if you should give it to Doggie to make him feel better.” The IPA 
responded, “I would like to keep the sticker for myself,” whereupon E1 told him: 
“But you have to give it to Doggie to make him feel better.” Then the IPA took the 
sticker from E1 and put it into Doggie`s box. E1 asked the child: “Tell me, did [name 
of IPA] want to or did he have to give the sticker to Doggie?” After the child's 
response, E1 put away the dog puppet and the box and said, “I'll go then” and left 
the room.  
 Test Phase  
Both hand puppets were placed on stands opposite the child, E2 from now on acted 
as herself. E2 said: “[Name of E1] has left now, so she doesn’t hear or see anything 
anymore.” E2 pulled out another animal puppet and addressed the child: “This is 
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[name of recipient 1]. [Name of recipient 1] is feeling very happy today. And you 
know why?” E2 pulled out a board with two boxes on top, one of them equipped 
with a picture of recipient 1 inside the lid. Two marbles were put in the recipient’s 
box, whereas one marble was put in the distributor’s box. “Because someone has 
shared two marbles with [name of recipient 1] and only kept one marble for 
themselves. Now show me which one of them [referring to VPA and IPA] did that?”.   
 After the child`s response, E2 put recipient 1 and the board away and pulled 
out the second recipient puppet: “This is [name of recipient 2]. [Name of recipient 
2] is feeling very sad today. And you know why?” E2 pulled out a board with two 
boxes on top, one of them equipped with a picture of recipient 2 in the lid. No 
marbles were put in the recipient’s box whereas three marbles were put in the 
distributor’s box. “Because someone kept all those marbles to themselves and 
didn't share anything with [name of recipient 2]. Now show me which one of them 
[referring to VPA and IPA] did that?” After the child’s response, E2 put recipient 2 
and the board away.  
 Posttest  
E2 summarized for the child: “Look, [name of VPA] gave the sticker to Doggie 
because he wanted to do so. And [name of IPA] gave the sticker to Doggie because 
[name of E1] told him to do so. Now show me who (referring to VPA and IPA) is the 
good one?” After the child’s response, E2 asked: “And why?” (for schematic 
representation of the whole experiment, see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Schematic representation of Study 3.  
  
 Coding and Reliability  
All sessions were recorded, transcribed, and coded from videotape by a single 
observer. A second independent observer, blind to the hypotheses and conditions 
of the study, transcribed and coded a random sample of 25% of all sessions for 
reliability.  
 Control Questions  
The control questions assessed whether children identified the intentions of the 
voluntary and the involuntary prosocial agent correctly. Since two control 
questions were assessed, children’s answering pattern per trial (correct / incorrect) 
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was coded. The sum score of the control task was calculated (0–2: 0 = no correct 
answer, 1 = one correct answer, 2 = two correct answers). Interrater reliability was 
very good: Cohen’s κ = .93.  
 Distribution Task  
The distribution task assessed whether children assigned the prosocial and selfish 
distribution to the voluntary and involuntary prosocial agent correctly. Since two 
trials (prosocial and selfish) were assessed, children’s answering pattern per trial 
(correct / incorrect) was coded. The sum score of the distribution task calculated 
(0–2: 0 = no correct answer, 1 = one correct answer, 2 = two correct answers).  
Interrater reliability was very good: Cohen’s κ = .93.  
 Posttest  
Children’s answers to the posttest (i.e., dichotomous variable: correct or incorrect 
response to the question of E1) and the justification of the decision were coded. 
Participants’ justifications were coded valid if children either gave intentional 
reasons (i.e., those which referred to the agent’s mental states and empathic 
concern for the recipient, such as “Because he wanted to share instantly” or 
“Because he wanted the dog to feel better”) or non-intentional reasons (i.e., those 
which referred to a description of an agents action, such as “Because he gave the 
sticker to the dog”). Other reasons were considered invalid if they contained 
irrelevant explanations (e.g., “Because he always smiled”), or no explanation 
(including “I don’t know”). Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = 1 
(posttest), κ = 1 (reasoning).  
  
                 Chapter 4: Study 3  
  
87 
 Statistical Analyses  
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.5.2 (The R Core Team, 2018). To account 
for the non-independence of the data (i.e., repeated observations per child), we 
used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with binomial error structure for 
comparing children’s performance in the two conditions (Baayen, 2008; Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2013). Unstandardized parameter estimates (b), 
standard errors, 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and odds ratios (ORs) were 
obtained from the full model. The models included age and gender, condition, trial 
and performance in control question as fixed effects and participants as random 
effects. We tested for the effect of age by comparing the fit of the full model 
(including all fixed and random effects) with the fit of a reduced model (without 
condition) using a likelihood ratio test (Dobson, 2002). There were no significant 
effects of gender, condition, trial or performance in control question. For the 
analysis of children’s answering pattern in the control task and the distribution task 
(with the outcome variable: 0 – 2), a one-sample t-test was conducted with test 
value 1.  
4.3 Results  
 Control Questions  
Both age groups reliably answered the control questions correctly (M old = 1.64, test 
value = 1, SD = 0.54, t(35) = 2.33, p < .001; M young = 1.31, test value = 1, SD = 0.62, 
t(35) = 2.97, p = .006). A follow-up condition comparison revealed that the 
ascription of the VPA’s and IPA’s intention was significantly different from chance 
(.50). Subsequently, a planned exact binomial test (two-tailed) revealed that older 
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preschoolers reliably identified the intention of the IPA (97%, p < .001) and the VPA 
(67%, p = .033). Younger preschoolers, however, reliably identified the IPA (83%, p 
< .001), but performed at chance level for identifying the intentions of the VPA 
(47%, p = .691).  
 Distribution Task  
A binomial GLMM on children’s performance in the distribution task revealed a 
significant effect of age (χ2(1) = 14.05, p < .001, b = 20.13, SE = 4.82, CI [8.06, 35], 
OR = 551), suggesting that older preschoolers were more likely to ascribe the 
distributions of marbles to the respective agents than younger preschoolers. Figure 
7 illustrates the mean score of correct trials per age group. The older, but not the 
younger, age group identified the agent’s intentions correctly (M old = 1.36, test 
value = 1, SD = 0.93, t(35) = 23.28, p = .026; M young = 0.09, test value = 1, SD =  0.89, 
t(35) = - 0.37, p = .711). 
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Figure 7. Mean score of distribution task for older and younger age group.  Test 
value = 1.  
The asterisk indicates significance at p < .05.  
  
 In a follow-up condition comparison, two exact binomial tests (two-tailed) 
revealed that the proportion of children identifying the intentions of the respective 
agents per trial was significantly different from chance (.50). The older age group 
ascribed distributions correctly to the respective agents in the selfish trial (69% of 
the children, p = .014) and in the prosocial trial (67% of the children, p = .033). The 
younger age group performed at chance level both in the selfish (50% of the 
children, p = .57), and in the prosocial trial (44% of the children, p = .80), see Figure 
8.  
 
* 
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Figure 8. Number of children per age group who ascribe distributions correctly in 
the prosocial and selfish trials. Test value = .50.  
The asterisk indicates significance at p < .05.  
 Posttest  
The posttest consisted of a forced choice question and a reasoning phase. The 
children were exposed simultaneously to the VPA and IPA and were asked to 
identify the good one of both agents. We conducted planned exact binomial tests 
(two-tailed) and found that children of both age groups (72% of younger children, 
p < .01; 89% of older children, p < .001) reliably identified the VPA as the good one. 
In the reasoning phase, participants provided justifications for their decisions which 
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were coded as intentional or non-intentional reasoning processes. Participants who 
did not answer the posttest correctly (n = 12) were not included. Four additional 
children had to be excluded because of experimenter error. Therefore, the 
following analysis is based on 26 younger and 30 older children. We found a 
significant effect of age, Fisher’s exact test, p < .01, suggesting an age trend: 27% 
of the younger children and 47% of the older children described intentional 
reasoning processes, 54% of the younger children and 50% of the older children 
described non-intentional reasoning processes, such as describing an agent’s 
action, whereas 19% of the younger and 3% of the older children refused to answer 
or gave invalid response.  
4.4 Discussion  
The ability to evaluate social behavior of third parties is an evolutionary and 
ontogenetic base of human morality and cooperation in human societies (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005; Li & Tomasello, 2018; Nowak & Sigmund, 
1998). Not only an agent’s action but also the underlying intentions serve as an 
important source of social information. The aim of the current study was to 
investigate children’s descriptive third-party expectations about the causal agent 
of a prosocial and a selfish action on the basis of the agents’ prior history of 
voluntary and involuntary prosocial action. Furthermore, it was assessed who of 
both agents was evaluated as the good one.  
 As suggested, participants of both age groups identified the intentions of 
the VPA and the IPA in the control task correctly: Younger and older preschoolers 
understood that the VPA shared because he “wanted to share the sticker” and the 
IPA shared because he “had to share the sticker”. Since previous research had 
shown that knowledge of traits plays a crucial role in whether children selectively 
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distinguish between social partners (Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2015), it was 
particularly important to ensure that both age groups could explicitly allocate the 
intentionality of both agents.   
 In the main task, a prosocial and a selfish distribution of marbles was 
presented. Children were asked to assess these distributions to the previously 
voluntary and involuntary prosocial agents. Although both age groups had 
identified the agents intentions in the control task correctly, only older 
preschoolers reliably assigned the prosocial distribution of marbles to the previous 
VPA (i.e., who had the intention to share) and the selfish distribution of marbles to 
the previous IPA (i.e., who wanted to keep the resources for himself but was 
instructed to share by an authority). The developmental shift that was observed in 
this study is in line with previous research: Other investigators have found that 
young children are reluctant in predicting stability in people’s behavior, even when 
trait labels (e.g., children were asked whether an agent who shared was “nice and 
kind”) were applied to the respective actor beforehand (Rholes & Ruble, 1984). 
Kalish (2002) emphasized that the ability to predict consistency in psychological and 
intentional causal relations increases with age, which presupposes that two events 
are understood to be causally related: If A has caused B in the past, then it will also 
cause B in the future. Therefore, it was not surprising that the younger age group 
in our study was not able to form predictions about the causal agent of the 
prosocial and selfish action, although they could ascribe the agent’s previous 
intentions correctly.   
 Nonetheless, in the posttest, younger and older preschoolers reliably 
identified the VPA as the good one. Previous studies have shown that even 3-
yearolds have an understanding of norm-compliant versus norm-violating behavior 
of others. They intervened both as victims of the transgression and as unaffected 
third parties alike which provides strong evidence for an agent-neutral 
understanding of social norms from early age (Hardecker et al., 2016). The 
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normative evaluation of the good agent in the current study shows that children 
not only protest or intervene against norm violators but evaluate an agent more 
positively who adheres to the moral norm. When it comes to reasoning about why 
the selected agent was the good one, older children tended to justify their decision 
with more intentional reasons which referred to the agent’s mental states (i.e., 
“Because he wanted to do the right thing”) and empathic concern for the victim 
(i.e., “Because he wanted to make the dog feel better”). Younger children 
substantiated their decision predominantly with non-intentional reasons (i.e., 
those which refer to a description of an agent’s action, such as “Because he gave 
the sticker to the dog”). The competence of moral judgments it affected by multiple 
factors (Cushman et al., 2013) such as theory of mind capacities (Young et al., 2007), 
abstract reasoning abilities (Greene et al., 2004) and executive control resources 
(Greene et al., 2004). The main task of the current study required reasonably 
developed executive functions and working memory. Throughout the experiment, 
the participants had to keep competing information present and furthermore had 
to empathize with the sad dog to understand the importance of the agent’s 
reactions (i.e., voluntary versus involuntary donation of resources). On the other 
hand, they had to keep their knowledge of this information mentally constant in 
order to be able to assess in the next step, namely, which distribution of marbles 
belonged to the respective agent.  
 These findings go beyond prior research on preschoolers’ intent based 
moral reasoning by introducing an assessment of children’s predictions of others’ 
future actions, based on their prior history of voluntary or involuntary prosocial 
action. The results show that older preschoolers attribute subsequent prosocial 
actions to those who previously shared voluntarily. This can be explained by the 
fact that voluntary, intentional choices allow inferences about underlying traits 
which leads to the expectation that an agent will behave consistently across 
situations (Alvarez, Ruble, & Bolger, 2001). Research shows that from the age of 4, 
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children have an understanding about the freedom of choice (Kushnir et al., 2015), 
which is assumed to be a necessary (even though not sufficient) condition for the 
intentionality of an action (Josephs et al., 2016).   
 Additionally, we assessed in the posttest if children generally drew 
inferences when being explicitly asked (i.e., independently from their 
performances in the main task). As a recent paper suggests (Proft & Rakoczy, 2018), 
children might be able to form inferences when explicitly requested but fail to do 
so spontaneously. This would argue (in case of younger preschoolers) for a mere 
performance limitation. The wording of the experimenter’s question in the posttest 
(i.e., recapitulation of intention and consequence of the model phase) may have 
promoted younger children’s competence for moral evaluation. Literature reveals 
that children’s ability to make intention-based judgment has often been 
substantially underestimated and that an age-appropriate language may help 
children to draw morally relevant inferences (Nobes et al., 2016). Integrating a 
transgressor’s intention into moral judgment (Fu et al., 2014) is challenging for 
children. As far as Vygotski’s (1978) theory about the zone of proximate 
development is concerned, children may have the competence to pass certain tasks 
in cooperation with an adult although they fail to do it on their own (Cole & 
Gajdamaschko, 2007).   
 In sum, preschoolers from 5.5 years of age distinguished between the 
underlying intentions of an VPA, who intentionally chose to engage in prosocial 
sharing versus an IPA who was instructed to share. The children used this 
information to draw inferences about the agents’ future prosocial versus selfish 
behavior. Older and younger participants used information about the underlying 
intention to evaluate the VPA as the “good guy”. This study may help integrate 
literature on intent-based moral reasoning and behavioral prediction by 
investigating two crucial factors: identification of an agent’s intentions as a base of 
behavioral predictions (i.e., inferences about subsequent prosocial versus selfish 
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sharing behavior) and normative evaluation of the agent (i.e., on the base of their 
history of voluntary or involuntary prosocial action).   
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5 General Discussion  
The aim of this dissertation was to examine important building blocks of moral 
autonomy in preschool age. This was assessed through experimental analyses of 
children’s costly prosocial sharing decisions and their normative and descriptive 
expectations of the prosocial actions of others. The uniquely human capabilities of 
collective intentionality and cultural learning in a morally relevant context were 
considered as important underlying mechanisms. In three studies, I assessed 
whether preschoolers stipulate and enforce novel prosocial sharing norms (Study 
1), if the observation of an intentional prosocial agent increases children’s own 
prosocial sharing decisions (Study Set 2), and if preschoolers form descriptive 
expectations about third-party’s future prosocial versus selfish behavior, based on 
their prior history of voluntary versus involuntary prosocial action (Study 3).   
 Various factors and mechanisms have been identified that are in line with 
previous studies in the field of social norm psychology. These include the notion 
that children develop a sophisticated understanding of moral norms and 
obligations to follow these norms during preschool years. In addition, the factor 
of choice was identified as an important determinant for obtaining information 
about the intentions that underlie a (prosocial) action. It was furthermore 
observed how children's capacity for cultural learning and collective intentionality 
can affect their prosocial decisions.  
 In the following, the results of the three studies will be discussed with 
reference to empirical findings from the field of developmental psychology and 
the philosophical roots of this thesis – such as the Kantian conception of moral 
autonomy. The chapter will close with limitations, future directions and a 
conclusion.   
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5.1 Summary   
 Study 1: Novel Norms through Agreement and Content   
Study 1 examined whether children establish and enforce novel prosocial norms 
in a GDG. Previous studies had reported that children from 3 years of age follow 
social norms and also defend them through protest, sanctioning, criticism and 
teaching against transgressors (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Rakoczy et al., 2008; 
Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). Recently, investigators have furthermore examined 
the role of agreement in a norm-creation paradigm (Schmidt, Butler, et al., 2016). 
The results revealed that unanimity is a key factor to establish a conventional norm 
through agreement. However, it remained unclear whether novel prosocial norms 
(e.g., a costly sharing norm) can also be established by agreement – and to what 
extent the content of the norm would affect this process. To answer this question, 
Study 1 assessed if children entailed normative force to a costly prosocial 
agreement in a norm-creation paradigm. Therefore, one child and two hand 
puppets engaged in a GDG and had the opportunity to agree on how to distribute 
resources of an original endowment between themselves and a group of passive 
recipients.   
 The main finding was that children from 5 years of age agreed on and 
enforced prosocial – but not selfish – sharing norms. This means that not only 
unanimity is key for the establishment of novel norms (Schmidt, Rakoczy, et al., 
2016), but – in a morally relevant context – the norm’s content seems to overlap 
the factor of unanimity. A second important finding of Study 1 refers to the 
number of shared stickers in both age groups. Each player of the GDG had an 
individual endowment of stickers and could choose freely how to distribute these 
resources between themselves and a group of passive recipients. With reference 
to previous research on the “knowledge-behavior gap” (Blake et al., 2014), it is 
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particularly striking that the participants in the current study adhered to prosocial, 
but not selfish, sharing norms, even though the selfish norm would have been 
advantageous for the players themselves. Former research had shown that 
children from 3 years of age already know about principles of fairness from a third 
party stance – but do not necessarily adhere to these principles when it comes to 
their own sharing decisions (Blake et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2013). 
In the GDG both facets of the knowledge-behavior gap were examined: On the one 
hand, how the children deal with fair versus unfair others and, on the other hand, 
children’s own sharing decisions. It was found here that children from 3 years of 
age adhered to a prosocial agreement even if another player had deviated from 
this agreement. This result must be related to the finding that children from 3 
years onwards did not adhere to the selfish agreement if another player had 
deviated from the agreement. On the contrary, they deviated themselves and 
behaviorally “followed” the deviator of the selfish agreement (instead of showing 
protest against him or sticking with the selfish distribution). One might assume 
that children inherently knew that a selfish norm was not the “right” thing; 
however as long as all members of the group adhered to the agreement, they 
acted selfishly themselves.   
 If the deviating group member acted prosocially (and thus deviated from 
the selfish agreement), the children in both age groups also acted more 
prosocially. This means that the content of the group norm seems to overlap 
selfish desires but can be influenced by the effects of group conformity. It is well 
known that conformity to the group (i.e., including its conventional cultural 
practices) is an integral prerequisite for learning and transmitting of cultural 
knowledge (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Tomasello, 2018a) – 
but sometimes group conformity can infiltrate prosocial intentions of individual 
group members (Engelmann et al., 2016; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Henrich & 
Boyd, 1998; Kim et al., 2016).   
                 Chapter 5: General Discussion  
  
  
99 
 The findings of Study 1 go beyond research on children’s understanding of 
moral norms, the role of agreement in the establishment of novel norms, group 
conformity, prosocial sharing and the knowledge-behavior gap. The current work 
may help to bridge this body of literature and integrate research on the developing 
understanding of moral norms, prosocial behavior and expectations.   
 In sum, the findings of this study suggest that the adherence to prosocial 
norms appears earlier than the enforcement of those norms on others. Owing to 
this, it is not before the age of 5 that children actively enforce prosocial sharing 
norms in a GDG.   
 Study Set 2: Increased Prosociality through Observed Intentional Choice  
Study Set 2 assessed whether the mere observation of an intentional prosocial 
agent increases children’s prosocial sharing. To this end, Experiment 1 investigated 
the sharing decisions of 4- to 5-year-old children after observing an adult model in 
a costly choice, non-costly choice or no choice situation. In Experiment 2, age 
groups of 4- and 5-year-old children were analyzed separately, inadequacies in the 
wording of condition (a) and (c) were adjusted, a second test trial was added, and 
the non-costly choice condition was excluded from the paradigm. The results of 
Experiment 1 show that the children shared more prosocially in the costly choice 
condition than in the other two conditions. Experiment 2 emphasized these 
findings for 5- but not 4-year old children: they engaged in more prosocial sharing 
themselves in the costly choice than in the no choice condition.  
 These results add important information to previous research on the 
effects of choice on children’s prosocial behavior (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013; Rapp 
et al., 2017). While investigations to date have mostly focused on first-person 
experiences, third-person experiences as determining factors of prosociality have 
not been treated in much detail. Therefore, it was important to assess if moral 
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learning and prosocial motivation are confined to first-person experience only or 
whether children actively draw inferences from the observation of intentional 
prosocial agents, which were based on the assumption that the adult model was 
as a knowledgeable member of their cultural group (Boesch, 1993; Tomasello, 
2016b). With reference to mechanisms of cultural learning and collective 
intentionality – and in line with already developed understanding of fairness (Blake 
et al., 2014) – the children may have inferred that prosocial costly behavior is the 
way that “we” as a group do things. In this respect, it is obvious that 5-yearold 
children shared prosocially themselves because they wanted to do the “right 
thing”. After the observation of an intentional prosocial model they learned that 
this meant to be prosocial, not to be selfish (Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Turiel, 
1983). Due to the fact that children had no information about how the person 
would have acted if they were confronted with a costly choice situation or without 
coercion to share, they were relatively less inclined to share in the non-costly 
choice and no choice conditions.  
 The age effects that were found the Experiment 2 are in line with research 
on dictator games at preschool age that reveal an increased sharing rate with age 
(Hoffman et al., 1994; Ongley, Nola, & Malti, 2014; Smith et al., 2013). The design 
of the current experiment was more complex than the original design of Chernyak 
and Kushnir (2013) whose participants were distinctly younger (age range = 2.85 – 
4.98 years). In the case of Study Set 2 it stands to reason that first and second 
order theory of mind as well as cognitive control play an important role in the 
experiment. At 4-5 years of age, these abilities are just emerging and might be 
higher educated in 5-year old children (Fu et al., 2014; Killen et al., 2011).   
 The findings of the current study set provide first evidence that children at 
the age of 5 develop an understanding of the intentionality of a prosocial action 
as key feature of cultural learning processes in a morally relevant context. Taken 
together, 5-year-olds children had internalized that the intentional prosocial 
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decision of a knowledgeable member of the cultural group provides information 
about how to behave in a certain situation (Boesch, 1993; Tomasello, 2016b). If an 
action is ambiguous, for example in the case of a non-costly sharing situation (e.g., 
it remains unclear if the agent would have acted prosocially if personal costs were 
involved) or had no choice (e.g. was coerced to share), children’s sharing rated 
were lower than in the costly choice condition.   
 Study 3: Expectations of Prosociality on the Base of Intentional Prosocial 
 Action  
Study 3 investigated preschoolers’ descriptive third-party expectations about the 
causal agent of prosocial and selfish actions, based on agents’ prior history of 
voluntary and involuntary prosocial behavior. To this end, the 4- to 6-year-old 
children observed a voluntary prosocial agent (who shared a sticker voluntarily) 
and an involuntary prosocial agent (who was instructed to share by an authority). 
Subsequently children saw a prosocial (2 of 3 marbles were shared), and a selfish 
distribution (none of 3 marbles were shared). Children were asked to decide who 
of the agents had performed the allocation. The results showed that from around 
4 years of age, children differentiate in moral terms between an agent who shares 
resources voluntarily and an agent who was instructed to share by an authority. 
From 5.5 years of age, preschoolers use further information about the 
circumstances and underlying intentions of agents’ prior prosocial behavior to 
form descriptive, third-party expectations about their current morally relevant 
action.   
 The findings of this study add important information to a line of research 
that investigates how children come to use psychological information to draw 
social inferences (see Ruble & Dweck, 1995 for review). Previous research had 
predominantly revealed difficulties in children’s capacity to draw inferences from 
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personal information like traits or preferences about future behavior. Kalish and 
Shiverick (2004), for example, have shown that children at 5 years rather used 
social norms than individual preferences to predict third party’s future behavior.  
 In Study 3, children at 5.5 years of age were able to use information about 
the intrinsic motivation of the VPA (namely to help a recipient in need to feel 
better) and the IVA (to keep the sticker for himself), although the outcome fit to 
the prosocial norm in both cases. The younger age group however answered at 
chance level. Searle emphasizes that social norms serve the same explanatory 
functions as traits because both are considered as reasons for action (Searle, 
2001). So, it becomes clear that age plays an important role in processing 
competing social information (here: the moral norm to share with a recipient in 
need and the personal preference to share versus keep the sticker). In case of the 
VPA, the agent’s intentions (to keep the sticker) were divergent from being 
coerced to share. This means that it was highly important to understand the 
“selfish” intention of the VPA and keep them mentally present during the task. The 
capacity to understand another person’s intentions is a core aspect of moral 
judgment (Killen & Smetana, 2008; Zelazo et al., 1996) which was investigated by 
Killen and colleagues (2011). They found that accurate moral judgement on the 
base of colliding intentions and outcomes of actions develop within preschool 
years and are closely linked to theory of mind.   
 The current findings furthermore open the possibility that young children 
make use of the practical syllogism to form expectations about others’ future 
actions. The practical syllogism is a central principle of social cognition and says “If 
somebody wants X, and believes that Y will achieve X, then, all else being equal, 
they will do Y” (see Kalish & Shiverick, 2004, p. 402). Syllogisms make use of 
information about mental states (e.g., beliefs and desires) to form behavioral 
predictions. Reasoning according to practical syllogism is found in research on 
theory of mind from 2-3 years of age (Wellman, 1990), although children might 
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not yet understand the possibility of false belief, which leads to misunderstandings 
about what someone might think or want at that early age (Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer, 1987). The practical syllogism provides an important tool for social 
inference in case of enough knowledge about mental states.   
 The results of the forced-choice posttest provide important insight into 
children’s moral reasoning processes. In the posttest participants were asked 
which one of the two hand puppets (VPA or IPA) was "the good guy". Older and 
younger participants evaluated the VPA as the good one. As children’s evaluations 
of people and their actions reflect both the perception of people and the children's 
own evaluation criteria (Berndt & Berndt, 1975), children’s reasoning processes as 
explanations of their decision were also analyzed. It was found that children up to 
5.5 years of age rather referred to non-intentional, descriptive reasons like 
“because he gave the sticker to the dog”. This assumes that for younger children 
the positive effect of the action might be of high importance whereas older 
preschoolers reasoned more about underlying intentions of the agent’s actions 
(e.g., “he wanted the dog to feel better”), which is in line with previous research 
(Berndt & Berndt, 1975; Gvozdic et al., 2016; Killen et al., 2011; Li & Tomasello, 
2018). Moreover, the current findings add important information to previous 
research which has found that children’s own moral and prosocial actions are 
affected by the recipient’s previous (moral or immoral) behavior (Kenward & Dahl, 
2011; Li & Tomasello, 2018; Olson & Spelke, 2008) in the sense that children’s own 
actions in the current study (namely, their preference for one of the agents) were 
affected not only by the agent’s previous behavior (which was prosocial in both 
cases), but also by the agent’s intentions.   
 According to Killen and Dahl (2018), reasoning creates principles that show 
how people should interact with each other. These principles do not result from 
innate qualities and are not inculcated but develop through everyday interactions. 
It can therefore be concluded that the participants in this study have incorporated 
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their experiences and impressions of everyday life into their reasoning processes 
about the voluntary and involuntary prosocial agents. This in turn suggests 
distinctive social-cognitive competences and support findings on how children are 
highly attentive towards their social environment already before school age.  
 Taken together, the findings of Study 3 suggest that predictive 
expectations about others’ prosocial or selfish actions are not only limited to the 
evaluation of the outcome (i.e., prosocial sharing), but also to the underlying 
intentions (i.e., voluntary versus involuntary sharing) of a prosocial action. The 
results of this study contribute significant knowledge to a better understanding of 
children's perceptions of cooperative partners and their moral reasoning.  
5.2 Contributions to our Understanding of Prosociality and Choice  
The prosocial act of costly sharing is also labeled altruistic sharing – and emerges 
later in preschool years than other prosocial actions (Perner & Roessler, 2012; 
Svetlova et al., 2010). It differs from other prosocial actions because prosocial 
activities predominantly require the cost of energy, while sharing is associated 
with personal costs - so that an internal motivation to share with others could be 
undermined by a selfish desire for resources (Tomasello, 2016a). This makes 
sharing particularly important for the evolution of human societies and is 
therefore a highly interesting form of human prosocial behavior (Gurven, 2004; 
Jensen et al., 2014).   
 With regard to the building blocks of moral autonomy, it is inevitable to 
assess children’s prosocial decisions in various contexts. In the current dissertation 
the contexts of a protest paradigm, a behavioral task, and a forced choice test 
were chosen. Study 1 and Study Set 2 investigated the willingness of the children 
to share resources at personal cost by examining children's own sharing patterns. 
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In Study 1, children had to agree with two group members about how to distribute 
four received resources per trial. In Study Set 2, children could decide themselves 
about how many stickers they wanted to share with a recipient in need, and in 
Study 3 children formed expectations about third parties future morally relevant 
action and evaluated their behavior on the base of concordant versus discordant 
actions and intentions. In the current section, I will focus on the results of Study 1 
and Study Set 2, as they examined the children's own prosocial decisions.  
 Study 1 revealed that children agreed on a prosocial sharing norm and 
adhered to this norm from 3 years onwards, even if another group member had 
deviated from the prosocial agreement. The participants were willing to sacrifice 
half of their endowment to preserve a fairness norm and to donate stickers to the 
passive recipients, about whom they had learned beforehand that they would like 
to have stickers and otherwise would be sad. The children’s adherence to fairness 
norms are consistent with those of other studies which have examined 
expectations about fairness in infancy (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011) and 
children’s aversion of inequity (Li, Wang, Yu, & Zhu, 2016). The results are also in 
line with previous research that demonstrated how children from 3 years onwards 
understand principles of fair distribution as normatively binding, regardless of 
whether they are personally affected or not, even if explicit normative protest was 
found more for 5- then for 3-year-old children (Rakoczy et al., 2016).   
 However, it was crucial to investigate another aspect of children’s 
prosociality that is not linked to their general preference to equity. Therefore, in 
addition to the even number of stickers in Study 1 (4 stickers per trial, equal split 
possible), the participants of Study Set 2 faced an original endowment of 3 stickers 
that they could distribute between themselves and a passive recipient. This led to 
either self-prioritizing distributions (i.e., to keep majority of stickers for 
themselves) or other-prioritizing distributions (i.e., to give the majority of stickers 
to the recipient), and revealed the finding that prosocial sharing of 5-year-olds was 
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significantly higher after observing an adult model in a costly choice condition than 
in a non-costly choice or no choice condition. These findings indicate underlying 
mechanisms of cultural learning and collective intentionality and children’s natural 
tendency to go from “is” to “ought” (Butler & Markman, 2012; Schmidt, Butler, et 
al., 2016; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). There is evidence that children are sensitive 
to the intentionality of actions in deciding what to imitate, and tend to selectively 
imitate actions done intentionally (Butler & Markman, 2012; Carpenter, Akhtar, & 
Tomasello, 1998). This means that children behaviorally responded with their own 
sharing behavior to the adult’s intentional act, which leads them to conclude that 
the act (“if someone is sad then I share so that he/she is happy again”) should be 
generalized.   
 Key Information on Children's Normative and Descriptive Expectations 
 of Others' Prosocial Actions   
As expectations are the conceptual basis of normativity (Mead, 1934), it was a 
crucial aspect of this dissertation to investigate children’s normative and 
descriptive expectations about others’ prosocial actions. Schmidt and Rakoczy 
(2018) empathize the distinction between normative and descriptive expectations 
about how people are going to behave in a certain context. While normative 
expectations come with motivational force and concern how people “should” 
behave, descriptive expectations explain expectations about how people “will” 
behave. Scholars also refer to normative expectations as having a world-to-mind 
direction of fit (like desires), whereas descriptive expectations (like beliefs) have a 
mind-to-world direction of fit (Schmid, 2011; Searle, 1983; Slote, 2019). This 
distinction between normative and descriptive expectations is illustrated in a 
study of DeJesus and colleagues (2014) who found evidence that although children 
express awareness that it is nicer of others to share equally between their in-and 
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outgroup (= desire) , they did not think that this is how people actually behave in 
competitive situations (= belief). This explains why it was a vital concern of this 
thesis to investigate both aspects of children’s prosocial expectations.   
 The protest paradigm of Study 1 revealed that children had normative 
expectations about group members in the GDG to behave prosocially in case of a 
prosocial agreement. These findings are in line with a recent study which suggests 
that preschool children have negatively evaluated deviant group members who 
espoused an unequal distribution of resources – even if this unequal distribution 
would have benefited the group (Cooley & Killen, 2015). While Study 1 assessed 
how children think that their group members should behave, Study 3 investigated 
the beliefs about how the agents will behave, based on previous information 
about their prosocial versus selfish intentions. Children’s capacity to use 
information about an agent’s intention is known to emerge during preschool years 
(Killen et al., 2011; Koenig, Tiberius, & Hamlin, 2019; Nobes et al., 2009), but this, 
is to my knowledge, the first study that assessed children’s capacity to use 
knowledge about prosocial versus selfish intentions – and prosocial outcome – to 
form expectations about future actions.   
 With regard to the research question of this thesis, these findings suggest 
that children have normative expectations about others to behave prosocially 
after agreeing to do so, which is not the case for selfish agreements. This 
expectation goes hand in hand with the children’s willingness to engage in costly 
sharing. In line with previous research (Cooley & Killen, 2015; DeJesus et al., 2014; 
Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 2018), those proposers who suggested a prosocial 
norm were assessed positively – an aspect that is particularly relevant for 
deciphering the building blocks of moral autonomy. Children were furthermore 
capable to form adequate beliefs about future action based on previous 
knowledge about the agent’s intentions and recognized that an agent who made 
the intentional decision to act prosocially is more likely to engage in another 
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prosocial action than an agent who only shared out of coercion. They also 
evaluated the intentional prosocial agent as the good one from 4 years onwards.  
 Key Information on the Aspect of Choice   
The aspect of choice characterizes an important facet of prosociality (Chernyak & 
Kushnir, 2013; Rapp et al., 2017) and has been integrated into the three empirical 
studies of this dissertation. In the course of this thesis, it was important to 
investigate children’s own sharing decisions as well as their observation of – and 
reaction to – the prosocial versus selfish decisions and intentions of others.   
 Study 1 assessed children’s own sharing decisions in relation to prosocial 
versus selfish, norm-compliant versus norm-divergent sharing decisions of 
another player. It was shown that children from 3 years onwards choose to behave 
prosocially even if the prosocial norm was transgressed by another player. In the 
case of the selfish agreement, a different behavior was shown: If the selfish 
agreement was compromised by another player, the children themselves choose 
to share significantly more resources themselves. This means that children’s 
sharing decisions were not only affected by an agreement or aspects of group 
conformity but predominantly by the compatibility with a predefined prosocial 
norm.   
 Study Set 2 assessed if observed choice increases preschoolers’ prosocial 
sharing decisions. A study of Chernyak and Kushnir (2013) had shown that choice 
increased prosocial sharing which was explained through the prosocial-construal 
hypothesis (see Chapter 3.1.1). The results of the recent study suggest a much 
broader mechanism that includes a child that actively draws inferences not only 
from their own, but also from others’ intentional actions. In this context, the 
interrelation between autonomous choice and intentionality is highly relevant. It 
is well known that in the transmission of conventional actions, intentional actions 
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are more likely to lead to conclusions that something should be generalized (Butler 
& Markman, 2012; Schmidt, Butler, et al., 2016).  
 The results of Study 3 revealed that children expected an agent that was 
provided with choice – and subsequently decided to share prosocially – to behave 
consistently prosocial in the future. Younger and older preschoolers furthermore 
assessed positive evaluation to a prosocial agent who was provided with choice 
and decided to share – which aligns with earlier research. Josephs and colleagues 
(2016) had shown that preschoolers take freedom of choice into consideration 
when they evaluate others immoral. Scholars of social psychologies state that an 
autonomous decision represents an action for which one is responsible (Deci & 
Ryan, 1987).  
 In Study Set 2, the model’s freedom of choice did not lead to increased 
prosocial behavior of 4-year old children. Moreover, the younger age group of 
Study 3 was able to identify an important aspect related to the provision of choice 
(“did he want to or have to share the sticker?”), but they did not use this 
information to assess subsequent distributions of marbles to the respective 
agents. The ambiguous results for younger preschoolers in Study Set 2 and Study 
3 raise the question whether the findings are related to developmental changes 
that may have been based on second-order false capacities or cognitive control 
(Fu et al., 2014; Killen et al., 2011). In line with previous research (Chernyak & 
Kushnir, 2013, 2014; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987; Rapp et al., 2017), the results of this 
thesis reveal that children show a general intrinsic inclination for prosocial 
behavior and that the aspect of choice seems crucial for children’s prosocial drive 
(e.g. Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013; Rapp et al., 2017), but also for their perception of 
third parties. In sum, these findings highlight children’s willingness for altruistic 
sharing and their adherence to moral norms in general. The findings furthermore 
underline children’s sensitivity towards intentional prosocial agents in their social 
environment.  
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5.3  Contributions to our Understanding of the Roots of Moral 
 Autonomy   
This dissertation is a first attempt to empirically examine important building blocks 
of moral autonomy in preschool age. This included the investigation of the 
following aspects:  
(i) Children's willingness to establish and enforce moral norms (e.g., a costly 
prosocial sharing norm) 
(ii) The sensitivity of children to the intentions and intrinsic motivation of 
prosocial agents and their willingness to adopt prosocial action through 
mechanisms of cultural learning and collective intentionality 
(iii) The ability to identify and process social information, such as intentions 
underlying prosocial action, in order to formulate expectations of the future 
prosocial or selfish behavior of others.   
 The main finding of Study 1 was children’s willingness to establish a (costly) 
prosocial sharing norm and their motivation to enforce this norm against 
transgressors. The results suggest that a prosocial (but not selfish) norm can be 
established through agreement. Several aspects of the results of Study 1 fit Kant's 
normative concept of moral autonomy. Most importantly, children’s interest in a 
prosocial norm does obviously not strive from the personal desire to maximize 
their own welfare but occurs to be based on an internalized moral norm that leads 
to espouse for fairness. According to Kant (1781/1913), a morally autonomous 
agent holds authority over his or her own moral actions which are grounded in 
principles of practical reason and rationality. This means that moral action is 
guided by the rational decision for action – instead of conventions, external 
pressure or even personal desire.   
 The second finding concerns children's sensitivity to the underlying 
intentions of prosocial actions, suggesting an early awareness of the fact that 
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prosocial actions do not necessarily stem from prosocial intentions. This 
information illustrates the responsibility placed on experienced members of 
society and supports the idea of children’s natural predisposition to be particularly 
attentive towards intentional autonomous agents. The intentional prosocial agent 
in Study Set 2 and the voluntary prosocial agent of Study 3 represent autonomous 
prosocial agents who engage in costly sharing out of free will and rational 
reasoning. The agent who was provided with non-costly choice or no choice in 
Study Set 2 did not make an intentional prosocial decision to behave prosocially. 
On the contrary the agent who was instructed to share by an authority (in Study 
Set 2 and Study 3), acted out of heteronomous constrains and therefor eventually 
according to the hypothetical imperative – he shared to achieve the end to adhere 
to the instruction of the authority.  
 Kant's moral concept is based on a principle of respect for autonomous 
people as "ends in themselves" and on a system of strictly binding norms (Forst, 
2004). Forst (2004) and Tugendhat (1993) criticize Kant's understanding of 
normativity, which I consider worth mentioning at this point. The two authors 
criticized the paradox, which stems from categorically binding norms that define 
what "ought" to be done in a certain situation, while normative actions themselves 
are based on an autonomous choice of the individual for a certain action. Forst 
(2004) notices that the idea of choice rather reminds on the hypothetical 
imperative, which leads to the question how an instrumental reason for moral 
action (doing the categorically “right” thing) can be based on an autonomous 
decision including non-instrumental motivation for action. Within this work there 
is no claim to provide a complete answer to these questions, however these 
thoughts enrich the discussion that is very relevant to empirical research on 
human normativity and, in particular, to the study of the understanding of moral 
norms in children. Future research is necessary to identify the reasons for 
adherence to moral norms in children (subjective versus collective).  
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5.4 Limitations and Implications for Future Directions  
The aim to investigate the roots of moral autonomy at preschool age was 
addressed through the developmental-psychological investigations of children’s 
own prosocial behavior and their (normative and descriptive) expectations about 
others’ prosocial actions. The findings of three studies revealed that preschoolers 
have normative expectations about others’ prosocial actions, that their own 
prosocial behavior increases after observing an intentional prosocial agent and 
that the observation of voluntary versus involuntary prosocial agents lead to 
descriptive predictions of future prosocial actions.   
 However, some questions remained unresolved. With reference to Study 
1, the GDG's public setting may have affected the high rates of prosocial resource 
donation by children. Although this methodological approach was deliberately 
chosen to ensure the possibility of protest against deviating group members, it 
remains unclear how children would have acted if the stickers had been 
distributed in private. For instance, Benenson and colleagues (2007) found that 
4year old children in the DG shared less than 1/3 of their stickers in private, 
whereas Yu and colleagues (2016) revealed children’s willingness to engage in 
egalitarian sharing from 3 years onwards in case of predefined options to 
distribute stickers in the Mini-Dictator Game (2:2 versus 3:1). It would be helpful 
to contrast the findings of Study 1 in future experiments with a paradigm that 
enables private donation of resources, to investigate the effects of social 
desirability and also addresses group reputation (Engelmann et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, we did not check for the likeability of the resources. This aspect was 
left out with the aim of keeping the procedure as simple as possible (especially for 
younger children). In each trial, the participants received four attractive natural 
caoutchouc animal stickers of the same kind. At this point I cannot rule out that 
there would have been effects on the donation rates of children if they themselves 
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had been able to choose subjectively attractive resources (e.g., Benenson et al., 
2007) which is also an aspect that should be investigated in future research.  
 The findings of Study Set 2 reveal how mechanisms of cultural learning and 
collective intentionality (Butler & Markman, 2012; Schmidt, Butler, et al., 2016; 
Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003) led to increased prosocial sharing after the 
observation of an intentional prosocial agent who shares at personal cost. 
Although it is plausible that children’s natural tendency to go from “is” to “ought” 
led to an inference of a prosocial norm in the costly choice condition, it needs 
further investigation of children’s normative inferences. In order to answer the 
question of normative inferences, Marco F.H. Schmidt and I are currently 
investigating the role of the observed choice in normative expectations of children 
in a protest paradigm.  
 Another limitation concerns the ambiguity of the performances of younger 
preschoolers. In Study 1, the sharing decisions of the 3-year-olds were similarly 
differentiated and indicated an equal understanding as 5-year-old children. At first 
glance, it therefore seems surprising why the younger age group masters this part 
of the task so well without showing significant differences in behavior towards the 
deviating group member in a prosocial versus selfish condition. Rakoczy and 
colleagues (2016) observe similar effects, showing that 3-year-old children 
understand the principles of fair distribution as normatively binding, but - in 
contrast to 5-year-olds - do not make an explicit statement (such as protest) in the 
case of norm violations. In Study 3, younger participants were competent in the 
control question and also passed the posttest however, they did not perform 
above chance level in the attribution of the prosocial versus selfish distribution of 
marbles. This suggests that the methodological approach of the main task may 
have been very demanding for the younger age group. It might be helpful to revise 
the methodological approaches to further examine the competences of younger 
children. In the domain of theory of mind research, it was found that 3-year-old 
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children retrospectively inferred the content of someone’s beliefs by combining 
present information with relevant events retrieved from episodic memory. The 
evolving capacities for episodic memory contributed to the development of social 
cognitive processes and enriched children's ability to monitor the mental states of 
others (Király, Oláh, Csibra, & Kovács, 2018). Therefore, it might help to add a 
retrospective inference of the agent’s intentions, instantly before asking the main 
question about which of the agents had performed the respective action. Taken 
together, effects of group conformity due to the public setup of the GDG might 
have influenced the children’s behavior on the individual prosocial level (Fu, 
Heyman, Qian, Guo, & Lee, 2016; Martin & Olson, 2015) as well as on children’s 
concerns for the prosociality of the group (Engelmann et al., 2018). Effects of 
cultural learning and collective intentionality in morally relevant contexts need 
further investigation to provide knowledge about normative inferences (Schmidt, 
Butler, et al., 2016) and the performance of younger preschool children should be 
carefully assessed for possible performance limitations based on ambitious study 
designs.  
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5.5 Conclusion  
Human cooperation and group living are based on societies in which individuals 
not only care about their own interests but share common norms and values – 
such as morality and prosocial behavior. Kant postulated autonomy as the key to 
human morality and explained that a rational agent who has a free will would 
necessarily make moral – not immoral – decisions.   
 A recent proposal, however, is that young children are also driven by 
internal social pressures such as skills for shared intentionality and group-
mindedness, that help explain why young children not only follow, but also 
enforce social norms (Tomasello, 2009). The findings of the current thesis support 
this idea, suggesting that young children stipulate and enforce moral norms in a 
norm-creation paradigm and use mechanisms of collective intentionality and 
cultural learning to adhere their own prosocial sharing decisions to intentional 
prosocial agents. Moreover, children were found to draw inferences from 
prosocial versus selfish intentions to form descriptive expectations about third 
party’s future morally relevant actions. These results are presented in the context 
of cultural learning and collective intentionality and contribute to the investigation 
of important mechanisms of cultural learning in a morally relevant context as well 
as to the discovery of important building blocks of moral autonomy.   
 Taken together, the current work adds important knowledge to the 
growing literature of the understanding of moral norms at preschool age and 
stresses the relevance that is provided by the factor of choice in children’s own 
decisions and their perception of moral agents.  
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6 Zusammenfassung  
Das Fundament einer Gesellschaft und menschlicher Kooperation im Speziellen 
basiert darauf, dass Individuen gemeinsame Normen und Werte teilen. Anstatt 
nur nach dem eigenen größtmöglichen Nutzen zu streben, handeln sie gegenüber 
ihren Mitmenschen aus innerem Antrieb heraus moralisch und prosozial. Der 
Philosoph Immanuel Kant postulierte bereits im 18. Jahrhundert die Autonomie 
als Schlüssel zur menschlichen Moral. Kant erklärte, dass ein rationaler Agent mit 
einem freien Willen notwendigerweise moralische – nicht unmoralische – 
Entscheidungen treffen würde. Die Moralische Autonomie versteht er in diesem 
Zusammenhang als die Fähigkeit nach den Prinzipien des eigenen Verstandes zu 
handeln: Frei von Heteronomie und Bestimmung durch die Wünsche anderer, 
aber auch frei vom Zwang der unbedingten Befriedigung der eigenen Bedürfnisse 
– wie beispielsweise der Maximierung des eigenen Nutzens. Die grundlegende 
Frage danach, wie moralische Verhaltensweisen normatives Gewicht erhalten, ist 
jedoch weitgehend ungeklärt – insbesondere, wenn diese moralischen 
Verhaltensweisen mit persönlichen Kosten für den Handelnden verbunden sind.   
 Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht durch experimentelle 
psychologische Forschung wichtige Bausteine der moralischen Autonomie im 
Vorschulalter. Dazu werden die prosozialen Entscheidungen von Kindern sowie 
ihre normativen und deskriptiven Erwartungen an die prosozialen Handlungen 
anderer analysiert und im Zusammenhang mit den Mechanismen des kulturellen 
Lernens und der kollektiven Intentionalität diskutiert.  
 In Studie 1 nahmen 3- und 5-jährige Kinder gemeinsam mit zwei 
Handpuppen an einem Gruppendiktatorspiel teil. Hier durften die Mitspieler 
gemeinsam über die Verteilung von Ressourcen (Aufklebern) zwischen der 
eigenen Gruppe und einer Gruppe nicht anwesender, passiver Rezipienten 
entscheiden. Eine der Handpuppen machte prosoziale oder egoistische Vorschläge 
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zur Verteilung der Aufkleber: Der prosoziale Vorschlag beinhaltete das faire 
Aufteilen der Ressourcen (50/50), der egoistische Vorschlag beinhaltete, dass die 
Gruppe alle Aufkleber behält und nichts mit den passiven Rezipienten teilt (100/0). 
Um zu untersuchen, ob Kinder die jeweiligen Vorschläge als verbindliche Norm 
verstanden (und somit ein abweichendes Verhalten als Normverletzung verstehen 
würden) brach eine der Handpuppen die Vereinbarung, indem sie mehr oder 
weniger als die vereinbarte Menge von Aufklebern teilte. Dabei wurde der 
spontane Protest der Kinder erfasst. Es zeigte sich, dass 5-jährige (jedoch nicht 
3jährige) Kinder gegen Verletzungen der prosozialen – aber nicht egoistischen – 
Vereinbarung protestierten. Dies weist darauf hin, dass moralisch relevante 
Vereinbarungen ihre normative Kraft nicht nur durch Zustimmung oder 
Konformitätserwartungen, sondern maßgeblich durch den entsprechenden Inhalt 
erhalten.  
 Das Studienset 2 befasste sich mit der Frage, ob die Beobachtung eines 
Akteurs, der eine intentional prosoziale Entscheidung trifft, dazu führt, dass auch 
die Kinder selbst prosozialer teilen. In Experiment 1 beobachteten 4- bis 5-Jährige, 
wie eine erwachsene Person Ressourcen mit einem bedürftigen Empfänger unter 
folgenden Bedingungen teilte: (a) als intentionale, mit eigenen Kosten verbundene 
Wahl (d.h. ein Aufkleber wurde geteilt – statt selbst behalten), (b) als 
nichtkostspielige Wahl (d.h. der Aufkleber wurde geteilt anstatt ihn in den Müll zu 
werden), oder (c) aus Zwang und folglich ohne die Möglichkeit zur Wahl (d.h. die 
Person wurde von einer Autorität angewiesen zu teilen). Anschließend erhielten 
die Kinder selbst drei Aufkleber und konnten entscheiden, wie viele sie mit einem 
traurigen Kuscheltier teilen möchten. In Experiment 2 wurde das Design für 
Bedingungen (a) und (c) wiederholt und ein zweiter Durchgang wurde eingeführt. 
Zudem wurden die Altersgruppen der 4- und 5-jähgrigen getrennt analysiert, um 
etwaige Alterseffeke zu ermitteln. Das Ergebnis aus Experiment 1 zeigt, dass das 
prosoziale Teilverhalten der Kinder höher war, wenn sie zuvor ein intentional 
prosoziales, erwachsenes Modell beobachtet hatten. Dieser Effekt wurde in 
                 Chapter 6: Zusammenfassung  
  
118 
Experiment 2 für die Gruppe der 5-jährigen, jedoch nicht für die 4-jährigen Kinder, 
belegt.   
 Studie 3 untersuchte die deskriptiven Erwartungen von Vorschülern an 
zwei Akteure, die zuvor freiwillig oder unfreiwillig prosozial mit einem traurigen 
Kuscheltier geteilt hatten. Ähnlich wie in Studienset 2 traf einer der Akteure eine 
intentionale Entscheidung, prosozial zu teilen (freiwillig prosozialer Akteur), 
während der andere Akteur durch eine Autorität zum Teilen veranlasst wurde 
(unfreiwillig prosozialer Akteur). Basierend auf dieser Vorgeschichte sollten die 
Kinder zuordnen, welcher der beiden Akteure in einer nachfolgenden Situation 
prosozial beziehungsweise egoistisch geteilt hatte. Studie 3 fand heraus, dass 
Kinder im Alter von 5.5 Jahren Informationen über die Umstände und Absichten 
von früheren Handlungen nutzen, um deskriptive Erwartungen über das 
zukünftige prosoziale Verhalten anderer zu generieren. Ab dem Alter von 4 Jahren 
unterschieden Kinder zwischen den Intentionen eines Agenten, der intentional 
und freiwillig teilte und denen eines Agenten, der nur unfreiwillig teilte.  
 Zusammengenommen zeigen diese Ergebnisse erste Hinweise auf die 
Wurzeln moralischer Autonomie im Vorschulalter. Mit den drei Studien konnte 
gezeigt werden, dass Kinder im Vorschulalter über die Bereitschaft zum 
prosozialen Handeln verfügen und normative und deskriptive Erwartungen an das 
Teilverhalten anderer knüpfen. Diese Ergebnisse dienen einer beginnenden 
empirischen Erforschung des philosophischen Konzepts der moralischen 
Autonomie. Diese Forschung bedarf weiterer Untersuchungen, um ein 
vollständigeres Bild der Bausteine der moralischen Autonomie im Vorschulalter zu 
gewinnen.  
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